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NOTES 
A Framework for the Allocation of Prevention Resources with 
a Specific Application to Insider Trading 
Every society prohibits activities that are detrimental to its general 
welfare and, in order to enforce the prohibitions, designs a mecha-
nism to deter individuals from engaging in the activities. Because 
such a mechanism consumes societal resources, it is in the best 
interests of society that this mechanism operate efficiently, as well as 
deter individuals effectively. 
A conceptual framework can be helpful in determining the vari-
ous resource combinations that will deter an activity effectively and in 
then choosing the one combination requiring the smallest resource 
expenditure. A framework will yield concrete results capable of 
being implemented by enforcement agencies only if it integrates the 
particular characteristics of both the prohibited activity and the per-
sons who typically engage in it. Since these characteristics necessarily 
vary among prohibited activities, enforcement agencies need a 
separate, specific framework for each activity in order to ensure 
accurate policy decisions. Yet prohibited activities (and the various 
groups of typical offenders) also have features in common, and it is 
therefore possible to build a general framework that can be modified 
for more precise analyses of specific activities. 
This Note enumerates and analyzes the three principal forces that 
induce individuals to abide by societal laws. These forces, or ele-
ments of effective prevention, are then combined to form a frame-
work of general deterrence that both identifies the areas in which 
society can introduce resources into the prevention plan and explains 
in a general manner what the effect of particular expenditures will be. 
In the final section of the Note, the framework is applied to a specific 
prohibited activity-insider trading in securities-to exemplify its 
utility in determining more effective applications of prevention re-
sources. 
J. THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE 
The need for a mechanism that deters individuals from engaging 
in undesired activities arises from the failure of the private market to 
induce an individual to consider the full social cost of an activity in 
deciding whether to engage in it. This market failure is a problem 
basic to many social concerns. Consider an entrepreneur whose 
manufacturing plant spews smoke into the air. His polluting activities 
impose significant costs on those living in the vicinity of his plant. 
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Yet, because these costs do not affect him, the entrepreneur does not 
consider them in determining the level at which to operate his plant. 
Consider also the bank robber who illegitimately gains $5000 at the 
rather insignificant cost of a few hours time, a gun, a ski mask, and 
perhaps some forgone earnings from "laying low" for a while. The 
bank robber's activity also imposed costs on other persons-costs that 
he does not consider in determining the profitability of his venture. In 
these and similar cases, the full social cost of the activity is greater 
than the private cost that the individual considers in deciding whether 
to engage in the activity. 
If individuals were induced to consider these external costs, they 
would perceive their activities as being less beneficial and therefore 
would either discontinue the activities or engage in them less fre-
quently. If the polluter were taxed an amount equal to the external 
costs generated by his polluting, his marginal cost of producing each 
unit would increase. At this higher schedule of costs, he would 
supply fewer goods at any given price and a lower equilibrium output 
with smaller total pollution would result. Society could induce the 
bank robber to consider the external costs of his activity by employ-
ing a deterrence mechanism that would cause him to associate a 
higher cost, in terms of fear, potential loss of freedom, and possible 
economic loss, with engaging in the activity. If this were done the 
robber would discontinue his activity since the costs he would asso-
ciate with engaging in the activity would presumably equal or exceed 
his expected benefits. In short, tlre process of internalizing the exter-
nal costs of an activity acts to correct ,the market failure and to prevent 
the over-allocation of resources to ·the activity that occurs if the 
benefits are not juxtaposed with the full social costs. 
This correction of the market failure is properly made by society 
rather than by any individual because prevention is a "public good"; 
that is, the benefits from a reduction in the level of an activity enure 
to all individuals, and the exclusion of any individual from receiving 
the benefits is impossible.1 Indeed, the internalizing must be con-
aucted by society since the benefits that would accrue directly to any 
individual would be too small to justify bis personal maintenance of 
the systems of courts, enforcement agencies, etc., that are neces-
sary for internalization. 
Society could internalize simply by imposing upon each violator, 
through actual apprehension and punishment, the full social cost of 
his undesired activity. The violator who suffers such an internaliza-
tion would be deterred from engaging in the undesired activity again 
because he would perceive that future activities would not be benefi-
1. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN TllEoRY AND PRACI1CB 
52-55 (1973). In fact, it is inefficient to exclude people from using pure public 
goods since the marginal benefit of use to each person is always greater than the 
marginal cost to society of his use. 
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cial for him. Internalization in this manner is termed specific deter-
rence. 2 
Specific deterrence without more, however, does not reduce the 
level of an activity to zero since it will not deter first offenders who 
are unaware of the practice of internalization. 3 Society can deter an 
activity completely, its objective in the case of prohibited activities, 
only by employing a general deterrence mechanism that convinces the 
individual who has yet to commit his first offense that the offense will 
be unprofitable. That is, society must create a threat of internaliza-
tion, made credible by the actual apprehension and punishment of 
past offenders, and communicate that threat to all potential offend-
ers. 4 
A general deterrence mechanism is based on the idea that threats 
of internalization are necessary to reach the societal objective of a 
zero level of prohibited activities. Accordingly, such a mechanism 
operates upon the expectations of potential offenders. An individu-
al's motivation for engaging in a particular activity is his expectation 
of benefit, whether the benefit be economic or psychological in 
nature. If the individual expects no benefit, he will not engage in the 
activity since the activity will require positive expenditures of time 
and effort. The objective of general deterrence is to develop counter-
motivations that will offset the individual's expected benefits from 
offending. Counter-motivations are expectations of costs (e.g., the 
loss of income or freedom) that the individual will associate with 
society's reaction (e.g., the imposition of punishment) to his viola-
tion. 5 
2. See J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 84 (1974). 
3. This statement assumes, of course, that an individual who is contemplating 
commission of his first offense is unaware that violators are punished. While un-
realistic in its extreme form, this assumption is helpful in isolating the idea that gen-
eral prevention plans must depend solely upon the manipulation of the perceptions 
and expectations of potential offenders. 
4. Specific deterrence is not part of a general prevention model since it is con-
cerned only with the deterrence of a specific individual. General prevention and spe-
cific deterrence, however, are intertwined since the threats used in general prevention 
are credible only when supported by some actual punishments. Actual punishments, 
in tum, serve as specific deterrents to the particular offenders who receive them. 
5. This conception of general deterrence obviously assumes that individuals are 
motivated by "rational self-interest" and, accordingly, balance expected benefits and 
costs before acting. Many readers may be unwilling to accept this assumption; few 
would disagree that research is needed to determine the psychology of crime. How-
ever, some of the disagreement with this assumption may be overcome by taking a 
broader view of "rational self-interest." Benefits can be viewed broadly to include 
everything from economic benefits to psychological pleasures. Costs can be defined 
to include psychological costs, such as embarrassment or the frustrations of discrimi-
nation resulting from prior prohibited conduct, in addition to imprisonment terms, 
lost income, or fines. Finally, the weighing process can be viewed not as a process 
of mathematical summation but rather as a process of resolving conflicting forces--
motivations and counter-motivations-that is, conducted subconsciously or con-
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Counter-motivations could be developed by threatening to impose 
on :the offender the full social costs generated by his offense. But a 
prevention scheme can succeed by creating expectations of costs 
sufficient simply to offset the offender's expected benefits. When 
these benefits are less than the social costs of the activity, as is often 
true in the case of prohibited activities, there is no reason for society 
to expend additional resources to create the expectation that the full 
social costs of an offense will be imposed. The expenditure of the 
additional resources would be inefficient because no social benefit, in 
terms of greater prevention, would be gained. 
In short, the level of social costs generated by an offense is 
irrelevant in determining the level of costs that society should threaten 
to impose in order to deter most efficiently. The social cost of an 
offense is not totally irrelevant, however, to the development of our 
general deterrence framework. Society would incur a net cost if it 
spent more on deterring an offense than the benefit-the avoidance 
of the offense's social cost-that it gains from successfully preventing 
the offense. Thus, the social cost of an offense serves as a ceiling 
upon the amount of resources that society should expend to manipu-
late an offender's counter-motivations. 
To be of aid in making resource allocation decisions, a deterrence 
framework must incorporate the motivations and counter-motiva-
tions operating upon a given potential offender. Ideally, a separate 
framework should be devised for each potential offender, but the 
costs of doing so are prohibitive and make it necessary to construct a 
framework built with a "typical" individual in mind. The typical 
individual in the model developed below is assumed to have but a few 
general characteristic. He is assumed to be risk averse, 0 motivated 
sciously. See J • .ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 36. Viewed in this light, the assump-
tion that offenders act in their "rational self-interest" becomes more reasonable. 
Furthermore, any model for the allocation of prevention resources must be rooted 
in some predictable rule of human behavior since the purpose of such a model is the 
determination of the most efficient methods of influencing that behavior. Of course, 
present inability to make detailed predictions of deterrent efficacy does not under-
mine the usefulness of developing and employing the best framework possible. 
This Note assumes that societal prevention resources should be used efficiently; 
that is, that resources should be expended only if deterrence is possible at reasonable 
levels of cost Because the impulsive person cannot be deterred at reasonable cost, 
it is irrational to expend resources in an attempt to deter him. Accordingly, impul-
sive behavior is not taken into consideration in constructing a workable model for 
efficient resource allocation. See Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of 
Homicide: I, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701 (1937). The authors admit that "[i]n some 
cases, at least, the irresistible character of the impulse is reasonably clear and the 
punitive treatment of the individuals involved is, therefore, not required in the inter-
ests of deterrence," id. at 757, but they conclude that the conduct of nondeterrablo 
persons should still be criminal in order to render them amenable to incapacitativo 
and reformative treatment, id. at 759. 
6. Risk averseness implies that a higher probability (greater risk) of actual im-
position of punishment will have a greater counter-motivating effect than a lower 
probability of such imposition. An individual who is risk averse should be distin-
guished from ~ individual who is risk neutral (i.e., unaffected by changes in tho 
April 19761 Allocation of Prevention Resources 979 
by self-interest,7 and influenced at least to some degree by all the 
elements of general deterrence set out below. In particular applica-
tions, alterations in the framework can be made to account for the 
characteristics prevalent among the typical violators of the particular 
law.8 
The framework developed in this Note takes into consideration 
the fact that two interrelated resource allocation decisions are at play 
in the deterrence context. One allocation decision is made by the 
potential offender, who must decide whether the motivations or 
benefits from offending exceed the counter-motivations or costs that 
he will incur. In attempting to deter, society tries to influence this 
decision by manipulating the counter-motivations associated with 
offending. If successful, society's intervention will negate the offend-
er's perceived benefit from offending and will induce him to expend 
his resources on nonprohibited activities.9 The other allocation deci-
sion is made by society, which must determine the kinds and amounts 
of resources that should be expended to induce potential offenders ito 
engage in nonprohibited activities. Efficiency 10 is society's goal in 
making this second allocation decision. 
The framework is presented as a mathematical formulation in 
order to bring into sharper perspective the various factors entering 
into these allocation decisions and to establish their interrelationships 
more clearly. The mathematical form is not meant to suggest that all 
probability of punishment) or who is risk-preferring (i.e., less counter-motivated by 
an increase in the risk or probability of punishment). See F. ZIMRING & G. HAW-
KINS, DETERRENCE 104-06 (1973). 
1. See note 5 supra. This assumption implies that an individual prefers to engage 
in an activity with positive net benefits rather than an activity that generates zero 
or negative net benefits, where net benefit represents the gap between total motiva-
tions and total counter-motivations. It might be argued that economics can say little 
about how an individual goes about deciding whether to violate a law or regulation, 
but such criticism would be inapposite. Economists do not attempt to say why a per-
son needs two apples to equal his satisfaction from one orange. Instead, economic 
theory defers to other disciplines for an explanation of the nature of individual pref-
erences and, taking a particular preference arrangement as given, explains what will 
occur when constraints ai;e placed upon individual choice. So, too, economic theory 
expects the sociologist and psychologist to determine the reasons why the benefits 
from offending take various forms and have varying trade-offs for individual offend-
ers. Economists step in to determine what will occur at the point where, in the mind 
of the potential offender, the costs of offending equal or exceed the benefits. 
8. See, e.g., text at notes 47-74 infra. 
9. This presumes, of course, that the individual has available some other activity 
with positive net benefits on which to expend his resources. This assumption is nec-
essary since, if all other activities have 1r = 0, the individual will be indifferent as 
between the prohibited activity and the alternative activity. Economic theory cannot 
predict a choice in this situation. Inactivity is not necessarily a preferable alternative 
to prohibited activity because the benefits are zero and the costs in terms of starva-
tion or loss of self-esteem may be considerable. Typically, the assumption that an 
alternative activity with positive net benefits is available will be reasonable. 
10. Resources are used efficiently when the µiarginal cost of the last unit of re-
sources expended on a project yields an equivalent marginal benefit. 
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elements of deterrence can be quantified and measured, for they 
cannot. It is used, rather, to indicate the relationships among the 
elements. A sum, for example, indicates that the summed factors 
each contribute their full measure, independently of the other, to the 
prevention of the prohibited activity. A precise quantification of the 
factors would be profitable, but the aim of the framework is to 
evaluate possible deterrence policies by determining the quality and 
significance of the effect of such potential policy changes.11 
II. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
This part develops a general framework for the allocation of 
resources to the prevention of undesired activities. Subpart A consid-
ers the three principal types of counter-motivations. Subpart B 
constructs a concrete model of the first resource allocation de-
c1S1on: the potential offender's decision whether to engage in a 
prohibited activity. This model is most accurately called a general 
prevention model, rather than a general deterrence model.12 General 
prevention, broader than general deterrence, is the sum of all the 
legal and extra-legal forces that induce individuals to be law abiding. 
Subpart C completes the general framework by isolating the criteria 
that underlie the second allocation decision: society's decision con-
cerning the kinds and amounts of resources to devote to the preven-
tion of offenses. 
A. The Types of Counter-motivations 
In deciding whether to commit an offense, an individual considers 
both the benefits and the costs that will result from his action. Before 
he acts, however, he does not know exactly what the benefits and 
costs will be. His decision whether to offend is therefore based on 
expectations about the resulting benefits and costs rather than upon 
the actual benefits and costs themselves. In analyzing the potential 
offender's decision-making process, it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween the potential offender's cost expectations, or counter-motiva-
tions, and the actual costs, and to focus on the former. 
Counter-motivations are of three principal types: primary gen-
eral deterrence, secondary general deterrence, and socio-pedagogical 
influence.13 It will become apparent as these three types are set out 
that the "costs," the expectation of which serve as counter-motiva-
11. See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 6, at 54, 61. 
12. See J . .ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 7. 
13. These labels are only partially in keeping with standard terminology. Tho 
term "socio-pedagogical influence" is used and similarly defined by Andenaes, J. 
ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 35-36, but his equivalent of "primary general deterrence" 
is simply "general deterrence," id. at 174. Andenaes does not apply a specific label 
to what is here defined as "secondary general deterrence," although he does recognize 
this element as an influence in general prevention. See id. at 24. 
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tions, cover a wide range of influences. They include the economic 
costs of fines, attorney fees, and forgone income while on trial or in 
prison, the more amorphous psychological costs of guilt, frustration, 
and fear, and the unpleasantness and loss of freedom resulting from 
imprisonment. 
Primary general deterrence (D1) refers to the counter-motiva-
tions associated with the fine, imprisonment, or other punishment 
officially established for violations of the particular law. The kinds 
of costs that individuals associate with primary general deterrent 
punishments cover a broad range of economic and psychological costs 
and vary somewhat among potential offenders for any particular 
punishment. The costs of being imprisoned for five years, for exam-
ple, are perceived differently by different potential offenders. While 
more specific research concerning the magnitude of these counter-
motivations is needed, it can be safely presumed that the magnitude is 
positively related to the level of punishment; that is, as the level of 
punishment increases, the preventive influence of the punishment 
increases.14 
Secondary general deterrence (D2) refers to the counter-motiva-
tions associated with the extra-legal sanctions imposed upon offend-
ers. Upon learning of a violation, other members of society may 
apply their own ad hoc punishments in the form of stigmatization, the 
withholding of employment, or social disapproval.15 These extra-legal 
punishments result directly from the individual's violation of a legal 
rule. Unlike the official punishment, however, they are often im-
posed in the absence of an official determination of the offender's 
guilt. Also unlike the official punishment, they are imposed by 
individuals rather than by society in a collective action. 
The existence and extent of secondary general deterrent costs 
depend upon societal and sub-group norms. Other persons will 
apply secondary general deterrent punishments to an individual only 
if they believe that he merits disapproval; they must be shocked or 
frightened by his actions or must believe that his actions were wrong. 
A thief, for example, would probably be stigmatized by non thieves 
but would meet with little disapproval from fellow thieves. If fellow 
14. See I. ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 61; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 
6, at 89; Kraust, Robinson & Cauthen, Variables That Influence Ethical Risk Taking 
Among Convicts, 1 PROCEEDINGS OF nm 80TH ANN. CONVENTION OF TIIE AM.. 
PSYCH. ASSN. 225, 225-26 (1972). 
15. See, e.g., I • .ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 24; Special Project, The Collateral 
Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929 (1970). Some sec-
ondary costs, such as attorney fees, are incurred by the offender rather than imposed 
on him. 
A violation may result in secondary benefits as well as secondary costs. Thus, 
a youthful offender may be stigmatized by his parents-a type of secondary cost-
but admired by his peers-a type of secondary benefit. In the model developed be-
low, D2 includes only the gross secondary costs, while the gross benefit variable, B, 
includes the secondary benefits. 
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thieves were the only persons in positions to apply these punishments, 
the thief would ·never face these secondary counter-motivations. 
Since the effectiveness of secondary general deterrence depends 
on the strength of societal norms that accord with and support the 
attitude of the law, no legal agency can directly control its applica-
tion.16 Yet this deterrent influence, virtually costless to the govern-
ment, can have significant effect on potential offenders.17 Accord-
ingly, legal agencies should make judgments about the existence and 
strength of secondary general deterrence and consider it in allocating 
prevention resources. 
The third and final type of counter-motivation is socio-pedagogi-
cal influence (Da).18 While both primary and secondary general 
deterrence involve expectations of both economic and psychological 
costs, socio-pedagogical influences are essentially only psychological 
costs. These costs might be described as feelings of guilt or as 
desires to follow socially approved rather than disapproved courses of 
action.19 They may be triggered by the commission of an offense, 
but they may also arise and have their greatest effect while the 
potential offender is deciding whether to commit the offense. For 
some individuals, socio-pedagogical influences are so stror!g that they 
prohibit the mere contemplation of committing an offense. 
Socio-pedagogical influences result indirectly from society's teach-
ing that certain activity is wrong, unfair, or undesirable. This teach-
ing, expressed by the legal and extra-legal punishment of those who 
have in the past committed the activity, creates a societal norm that 
16. Legal agencies may, however, be able to influence underlying norms. See 
text at note 22 infra. 
17. Of course, society might decide that, in the interests of rehabilitation, secon-
dary general deterrent influences should be discouraged for certain violators or classes 
of violators. For example, the benefit of prevention efficacy arising from expecta• 
tions of secondary punishments might be more than offset by the costs associated 
with the frustration of society's goal to return offenders to society with regular em-
ployment. This frustration of rehabilitation, however, is best handled by treating it 
as another cost that must be considered in deciding whether a particular prevention 
plan minimizes the social resource cost of prevention. 
18. The inclusion of socio-pedagogical influences in this model meets a criticism 
leveled by noneconomists against models of prevention that depend solely upon in-
creasing the costs associated with prohibited activities. See, e.g., Sullivan, The Eco--
nomics of Crime: An Introduction to the Literature, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 138, 
143 (1973 ). These noneconomists argue that it is insufficient to increase the oppor-
tunity costs of prohibited activities without altering the individual's "tastes" or "pref-
erences." Socio-pedagogical influences can be seen as both altering "tastes" and in-
creasing costs. 
19. Experiments by social psychologists have shown that people's judgments on 
such matters as moral issues, aesthetic preferences, and religious questions are 
influenced by what they are told is the majority view . • • . It is quite conceiv-
able that one of the functions of the criminal law ( even though it performs it 
unintentionally) is to inform members of a society of at least some of the moral 
attitudes of that society, and so to influence their own moral attitudes. 
Walker, Does the Law Affect Moral Judgments?, 4 BR. J. CRIMIN. 570, 570 
(1963). See J • .ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 35 (punishments and enforcements are 
messages sent to teach what is wrong). 
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individuals, in tum, tend to follow in their desire to do what is 
"right." The norm may be so pervasive that the tendency to avoid 
the activity rises to the level of a habit. 20 Such norms are often 
supplemented by widely held religious beliefs or beliefs concerning 
responsible social conduct. 21 
Legal agencies can attempt to strengthen socio-pedagogical influ-
ences by generating or augmenting societal norms. 22 The primary 
method of doing so is by imposing legal punishments on those who 
violate the putative norm and by educating society about the social 
undesirability of violations. Resources spent on primary general 
deterrence-on imposing legal punishments-should therefore be ex-
pended with a view toward maximizing the beneficial impact on 
societal norms. Of course, strengthening societal norms also increases 
secondary general deterrence since the same set of norms serves as 
its basis. 
B. A Model of General Prevention 
At this point it is appropriate to develop a concrete model that 
shows the relationships among the various elements of general pre-
vention and that aids in recognizing points at which society can 
expend resources for greater preventive efficacy. As noted above, an 
individual will commit an offense only if he perceives that it will 
result in a net benefit for him; that is, if he perceives that the benefits 
from offending are greater than the costs. This can be conceptual-
ized as 
where 
1r - net benefit to be gained if the activity is carried out; 
B = motivation or expected benefits; 
C = counter-motivations or expected costs. 
(1) 
A deterrent mechanism will be effective only if it reduces 71' to some 
value less than or equal to zero; this occurs when the motivations 
for the activity are totally offset by the counter-motivations. 
Counter-motivations C can now be replaced with the three basic 
types of counter motivation: primary general deterrence (D1), sec-
ondary general deterrence (D2), and socio-pedagogical influence 
(Da): 
(2) 
20. See J . .ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 8; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 
6, at 84. 
21. For example, societal norms against littering have probably developed more 
as a result of recent social environmental concern than as a result of statutes estab-
lishing fines for littering. 
22. See generally Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Perti-
nent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket, in PUBLIC ExPENDITURES AND POL-
ICY ANALYSIS 59, 70-71 (R.H. Haveman & J. Margolis eds. 1970). 
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The three added together total the full measure of counter-motivations 
since each makes an independent contribution to C. 23 As before, 
deterrence will exist when -rr is less than or equal to zero, which 
occurs when (01 + D2 + Da) ~ B. Benefit B is an exogenous 
variable in this model since the benefit to be gained from a violation 
cannot be controlled by legal agencies. Benefit is still defined broadly 
to cover any gains, rewards, or gratifications that an individual may 
receive from engaging in a prohibited activity. 24 
The next step in developing the model is to account for the fact 
that potential offenders, in deciding whether to offend, discount the 
expected costs and benefits by the probability that they will be 
received. When an individual compares the benefits and costs to him 
of engaging in a prohibited activity, he typically compares benefits 
with possible costs since from everyday observation he knows that 
every perpetrator is not caught and punished. Because the individual 
does not expect with certainty to receive the potential punishment, its 
counter-motivating influence upon him is lessened. 26 In attempting 
to quantify the counter-motivations associated with the legal and 
extra-legal punishments for a particular offense, it is therefore neces-
sary to discount the punishments by the probability that they will ever 
be imposed.26 
Thus, the efficacy of primary and secondary general deterrence 
depends not only upon the level of the punishment but upon the 
_probability that the punishment will be imposed, which in tum de-
pends upon the kind and amount of resources allocated for the 
investigation of violations and the prosecution and punishment of 
violators. Socio-pedagogical influences, however, need not be dis-
counted by the probability that they will ever occur since their inci-
dence is unrelated to whether the offender is legally punished. 27 
Benefits, like costs, cannot always be expected with absolute 
certainty. The variance from complete certainty is most likely to 
23. These three elements are added together to achieve total counter-motivations 
since they are mutually exclusive as defined. In reality, it may be difficult to deter-
mine the proper category for a particular counter-motivating influence, but, so long 
as it is placed in only one category, the summation will be correct. 
24. See note 5 supra. 
25. Research evidence indicates that a greater probability of receipt of punish-
ment will increase counter-motivation and, thus, alter choices. See Mischel & Gru-
sec, Waiting for Rewards and Punishments: Effects of Time and Probability on 
Choice, 5 J. PERSONAL11Y & Soc. PSYCH. 24, 28 (1967). 
26. Theoretically, time-preference discounting may also occur. In general, in• 
dividuals prefer a dollar today rather than a dollar next week; similarly, punishment 
in two months or five years has less weight than immediate punishment and so is 
less effective in offsetting benefits that will be received presently. The rate of time-
preference discounting will vary among individuals. Psychological research on this 
point, however, is inconclusive. See Grusec, Waiting for Rewards and Punishments: 
Effects of Reinforcement Value 011 Choice, 9 J. PERSONALI1Y & Soc. PSYCH, 85 
(1968); Mischel & Grusec, supra note 25. 
27. See text at notes 19-21 supra. 
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occur when the completion of the violation takes place some substan-
tial period of ti.me after the decision to proceed is made, since it is 
harder in such cases for the individual to gauge the plan's prospects 
of success. The probability of benefit will, in general, be an exogen-
ous variable, as will be the level of benefit, since it is not controllable 
by legal agencies in their prevention plans and must be taken as a 
given. In specific cases, agencies may be able to make reasonable 
estimates of the probability of benefit as perceived by the potential 
offender. 
In some cases, the probability of benefit may be influenced by the 
probability of detection prior to receipt of the benefit. For example, 
a burglar who realizes that he may be caught leaving the scene of his 
crime and may lose his stolen goods has a lower perceived probability 
of benefit than does the corporate director, unlawfully trading on 
inside information, who almost always receives his benefit prior to 
detection. In applying the model to specific cases such as burglary, 
an appropriate modification should be made. 
The expected net benefit28 may now be labeled 71', and the rela-
tionship among the elements is 
71' = Fb·B - (Fpp·P +Fps ·S + Ds] (3) 
where: 
Fb = perceived probability of benefit; 
FPP = perceived probability of punishment; 
Fps = perceived probability of secondary costs; 
P = punishment; 
S = secondary costs; 
Ds = socio-pedagogical influen~es; 
(Fpp · P] = primary general deterrence, (D1); 
[Fps· S] = secondary general deterrence, (D2); 
and by definition, 0 ~ Fb, FPP, Fps ~ 1. 
The probabilities inserted into the model are the probabilities 
as perceived by the potential. offender (,the perceived probabili-
ties). These probabilities were inserted because individuals rely 
upon their own perceptions in deciding whether to offend. The 
perceived probabilities may, of course, and usually do differ from the 
actual or objective probabilities since potential offenders are usually 
not fully apprised of the true level of resource allocation to enforce-
ment efforts. 
The difference between the perceived probabilities and the objec-
tive probabilities depends largely upon the extent to which investiga-
tions, apprehensions, and convictions-the results of prevention re-
source expenditures---are communicated to potential. offenders. The 
28. "Expected net benefit" means the expected value of net benefits and refers 
to a weighted average of the motivations (benefits) and counter-motivations (dis-
benefits) where the weights are the probability of the occurrence of each. 
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amount of resources expended on communicating such information 
(the c9mmunication factor), therefore, can materially affect the per-
ceived probabilities. Enforcement resources could be utilized in such 
a way that every violator was caught and punished. But if this 
enforcement efficiency were never made public, potential offenders 
would lack a clear understanding of the risks they faced. Similarly, if 
successful enforcements or the employment of new enforcement tech-
niques were only sometimes publicized, the individual would underes-
timate his risk. Legal agencies might cause an overestimation of risk 
by very carefully stressing every single enforcement. In short, the 
perceived probabilities upon which individuals base their decisions 
are functions of the communication factor and the objective probabil-
ities. Accordingly, the variables for prevention policy are the level of 
communication and the objective probabilities; that is, society can 
alter perceived probabilities by expending more resources on commu-
nication and on the apprehension and punishment of offenders. 
Communication is in several ways essential for effective preven-
tion. An increase in primary general deterrence, for example, will be 
effeotive only if communicated to potential offenders. Communica-
tion is clso necessary to support secondary general deterrence and to 
establish socio-pedagogical influences since, without communication, 
new societal norms will not be developed and existing norms will not 
be maintained. Furthermore, the public knowledge of a person's 
violation, necessary to trigger the imposition of secondary costs, 
would be lacking. Preventive efforts are principally directed at the 
individual potential offender, but effective efforts require some inter-
action between society and individuals and among individuals. Com-
munication is the basic vehicle for facilitating this interaction and 
determines the actual effective level of the three elements of preven-
tion. It is therefore an important policy variable. 
The objective probability of the primary general deterrent punish-
ment depends both upon the investigative and enforcement proce-
dures employed by society and upon the amount of enforcement 
resources society devotes to the detection, apprehension, prosecution, 
and punishment of violators. Clearly, for any particular prohibited 
activity, this probability will be positively related to the amount of 
resources allocated to these efforts. 29 
The apprehension and enforcement process consists of a series of 
steps, each of which must occur before the legal punishment can be 
imposed upon an offender. The probability that an offender will 
receive the legal punishment (Fop) is therefore 1:he product of a 
series of elemental probabilities each representing the probability that 
•a particular step in the procedure will occur. Thus, Fop is a joint 
29. Positing this positive relation assumes that the region of diminishing retums 
to any or all enforcement efforts has not been reached. 
April 1976] Allocation of Prevention Resources 987 
probability. The first probability in the series-detection, for exam-
ple--is a simple probability. Each subsequent elemental probability, 
however, is a conditional probability since its occurrence depends 
upon the occurrence of each prior step. Thus, if apprehension is the 
second step in the process, the elemental probability of apprehension 
is not the probability that an offender will be apprehended, but rather 
the probability that an offender whose offense is detected will be 
apprehended. Similarly, if enforcement is the third step in the 
process, the elemental probability of enforcement is the probability 
that an apprehended offender will have the charges against him 
proven. 
Because Fop can be viewed as ,the product of a series of elemental 
probabilities, society, in an effort to increase the number of offenders 
punished and thus the preventive influence of primary general deter-
rence, could choose to devote additional resources to increasing any 
of the elemental probabilities. If society expends all of its additional 
resources to increase only one probability, however, primary general 
deterrence will not be increased because the subsequent probability in 
the series will decline, For example, an increase in the probability of 
apprehension will not increase primary general deterrence if enforce-
ment resources are being fully utilized and resources are unavailable 
to bring to trial the additional offenders apprehended. As more 
offenders are apprehended while the same number of offenders are 
convicted, the probability of enforcement will decline and may offset 
the rise in the probability of apprehension. Thus, it would clearly be 
more efficient for society to add additional resources to each step in 
the process since only this method of allocation ensures an over-all 
increase in primary general deterrence. Any other allocation ap-
proach effectively creates bottlenecks in the enforcement process. 
With this caveat in mind, Fop can be replaced with a product of 
elemental probabilities. The precise choice of elemental probabilities 
to include in the general model is somewhat arbitrary since the 
probabilities vary in importance with the prohibited activity under 
consideration. The probability of enforcement (Foe), which in-
cludes the probability of proving a case or establishing a cause of 
action, is a basic variable for most offenses and should clearly be 
included in a general model. The selection of other variables is more 
arbitrary for they may or may not be important in a particular 
application of the model. For example, in the case of murder or 
robbery, the probability of apprehension of the violator is probably 
the most important variable in resource allocations because it is likely 
to be highly elastic with respect to new inputs. The probability of 
detection of the violation, however, is likely to be naturally close to 
one and hence inelastic with respect to additional inputs. In the case 
of insider trading, both the probability of "discovering a violation and 
the probability of determining the violator's identity may be very 
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elastic with respect to additional resource input. 30 The probability of 
discovery (Fod) and the probability of enforcement (Foo) are in-
cluded in the general model as the most efficient points for resource 
allocation with the understanding -that other variables may be substi-
tuted or added when the model is applied to a particular offense. 
Secondary general deterrent punishments are triggered by the 
same resource expenditures that trigger primary general deterrence. It 
is the detection, apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of viola-
tors that creates the scandal and draws the attention of the peers, 
employers, and friends who impose these secondary punishments. 
Thus, the probability of secondary general deterrence (Foe), like the 
probability of primary general deterrence, depends upon the elemen-
tal probabilities of successful completion of the steps in enforcement, 
Fod and Foe, However, it depends upon them in a significantly 
different manner. Fos is the sum of Forl and Foe, rather than the 
product, because the event of discovery alone, coupled with commu-
nication, can bring about secondary punishments: Full enforcement 
is not a sine qua non to secondary counter-motivations, 81 although the 
enforcement of a case to judgment or conviction does increase their 
force and their probability of occurrence. Thus, it is the combination 
of the two events, their sum, that determines Fos, 
The probabilities in relation (3) can now take on a more explicit 
form: 
where 
k · Fop 
k 'Foe 
k communication factor, which is variable; 
(4) 
(5) 
Fop = objective probability of primary general deterrent punish-
ment; 
Fos = objective probability of secondary general deterrent 
punishment. 
By substituting in the basic elemental probabilities of discovery and 
enforcement, (4) and (5) become 
FPP = k(Fod • Foe) 
Fps = k(Fod + Foe) 
(6) 
(7) 
30. In a civil suit apprehension is not necessary; judgment for damages may be 
established without the individual's presence. However, successful enforcement of 
judgment will be necessary. 
31. Because every step in the enforcement process is not necessary to trigger sec-
ondary punishments, alterations in procedural and investigative techniques will have 
greater impact on the counter-motivations arising from secondary general deterrence 
than on the counter-motivations arising from primary general deterrence. An indi-
vidual will perceive that he might receive secondary punishment even though the en• 
forcement procedure beyond the discovery stage breaks down. 
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where 
Pod = objective probability of discovery; 
Foe = objective probability of enforcement. 
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The relationships among the elements of prevention as expressed in 
(3) now become more explicit: 
7r = Fb • B - [k(Fod • Foe)P + k(Fod + Foe)S + Da] (8) 
The final factor in ithe model, socio-pedagogical influence (Da), 
requires a more concrete formulation before the model can be em~ 
ployed. Effective prevention, or at least its development, is a dynamic 
process. Socio-pedagogical influence is clearly the most dynamic 
element in the model since its development depends upon the pattern 
of resource allocation over long periods of time. 82 By definition, 
socio-pedagogical influences presently associated with a particular 
activity depend upon past enforcement and punishment patterns for 
·that activity since the punishment of offenders is society's principal 
teaching mechanism. 
Past punishment levels and society's past enforcement efforts are 
,therefore important factors in determining socio-pedagogical influ-
ences. These factors convey to individuals society's relative ranking, 
in terms of social undesirability, of each prohibited activity among all 
the activities it has prohibited. This item of information is instru-
mental in developing norms or attitudes toward the prohibited activity 
and in creating the individual's barrier to contemplation of the activ-
ity. 
The punishment level and enforcement effort level for a particular 
offense interact to indicate society's relative ranking of the offense. 
This interaction can be demonstrated by imagining a coordinate 
quadrant, as in Figure 1, where each point represents a possible 
combination of a punishment level and an enforcement resource 
allocation level. Points A, B, and C represent three prohibited activi-
ties. A set of social indifference curves33 can be imposed upon the 
quadrant with each curve plotting offenses that are equally disap-
proved by society. Offenses A and B may be ranked equally even 
though B is punished at a higher level than A, while society expends 
more enforcement resources on A than on B; both levels must be con-
sidered to determine how society ranks an offense. Those points lying 
on indifference curves farther from the origin represent activities con-
32. See text at notes 18-22 supra. Socio-pedagogical influences may be rein-
forced by secondary as well as primary general deterrence and, in tum, socio-ped-
agogical influences will affect secondary general deterrence by teaching people to 
stigmatize violators. Judgments as to the extent of this interrelationship are best 
made in specific applications of the model. 
33. :Indifference curves indicate preference rankings. Although only three curves 










sidered more onerous by society. The whole series of indifference 
curves represents society's total ranking of all prohibited activities. 84 
As demonstrated by the indifference curve analysis, an individual 
can tell little about the relative undesirability of an offense just by 
looking at the absolute levels of punishment and enforcement for that 
offense. A fine of $500, for example, has one meaning if ninety-five 
per cent of all other offenses are punished by a term of imprisonment 
and a different meaning if ninety-five per cent of all other offenses are 
sufficient resources to apprehend and punish half the individuals who 
commit a certain offense. The significance of this fact will vary 
depending upon whether society, on the average, expends resources 
punished by a fine of less than $500. Similarly, society may expend 
sufficient resources to apprehend and punish half the individuals who 
commit a certain offense. The significance of this fact will vary de-
pending upon whether society, on the average, expends resources suffi-
cient to apprehend and punish twenty per cent of all offenders or 
eighty per cent of all offenders. Thus, society's message as to the 
undesirability of an offense is much clearer if the enforcement effort 
level and punishment level for the particular offense are compared 
with the average levels for all offenses. 
It is appropriate at this point to begin to formulate the socio-
pedagogical influence factor more concretely. In the model as devel-
oped so far, Fop represents the objective probability that an individual 
34. See E. SUIBERLAND, ON ANALYZING CRIME 76-77 (1973). 
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who commits a particular offense will be punished. The relative 
enforcement level of a particular prohibition can therefore be ex-
pressed as Fop/Fop, where Fop is the average enforcement probabil-
ity for all offenses. The ratio Fop/Fo1, may be termed Re. In a 
similar manner, it is possible to formulate more concretely the relative 
punishment level for an offense. In the model above, ·P represents 
the punishment level for an offense. If P is the average punishment 
level for all offenses, the relative punishment level for an offense be-
come P /P. The ratio may be called Rp. 35 
These ratios together indicate the societal dispreference for an 
offense36 and thus serve as society's teaching message for the develop-
ment and maintenance of socio-pedagogical influences. Since Re 
and RP each convey a message to individuals, ,the total message is 
the sum of the two:37 
Message = (Re + RP) (9) 
It might be argued that enforcement levels are a more effective mes-
sage than punishment levels, 38 and hence that ( 9) should be a 
weighted sum. Whether enforcement levels are more effective than 
punishment levels is an empirical question, however, and is more 
appropriately taken into consideration in applying the general model 
to specific offenses. As used in this model, the summation indicates 
simply that the total message is given by the two parts acting together. 
Consideration again must be given to the fact that potential 
offenders are not fully apprised of the activities of enforcement 
agencies and thus base their decisions whether to offend on their own 
perceptions of those activities. Socio-pedagogical influences are 
therefore dependent not upon the message actually created by society 
but rather upon the portion of that message communicated to individ-
uals. This may be called the effective message, which will be some 
multiple or proportion, k, of the actual message, where k represents 
the communication factor and O ~ k. None of the message, some of 
the message, or all of the message may be communicated as k varies 
from zero through one. It is also possible to publicize enforcements, 
investigations, etc., so strongly and repeatedly that the effect of 
the message is multiplied, in which case individuals will view the 
offense as relatively more onerous than society views it. In this case 
k would be greater than one. 
Effective communication, k, will be a function of several varia-
35. Fop and P will also be averages since the enforcement resources and penalty 
will rarely be identical for every violation of a given law but will vary over some 
range; the Fop and P representative of a given activity would typically be the average. 
36. Individuals may perceive the rankings of offenses somewhat differently, for 
they will combine the message received from society with their existing religious and 
ethical views and their views about socially acceptable conduct. Yet, these individual 
differences are apt to average out so that we can state as a generalization that socio-
pedagogical influence is some function of the above-described ratios. 
37. See text at note 11 supra. 
38. See, e.g., Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. EcoN. 169 (1968), 
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bles, most of which are exogenous, such as the existence of news 
media, the media's attitude toward disseminating such information, 
and the number of occurrences that trigger dissemination. A trigger-
ing occurrence might be a successful enforcement, the imposition of 
an unusual punishment, or the passage of a new law or regulation. 
Effective communication will be positively related to the incidence of 
these occasions that trigger discussion or media coverage. Enforce-
ment agencies might increase communication by creating triggering 
occasions in the form of press releases about new levels of enforce-
ment resource expenditures or procedural changes that permit easier 
enforcement. 39 
The message actually communicated to individuals can be repre-
sented as: 
Effective Message (M) = k(Re + Rp), (10) 
The k factor thus determines whether an effective message will be 
nonexistent, widely communicated, or somewhere in between. The 
effectiveness of the message depends in part upon the nature of the 
prohibited activity. An activity may be such that the only occasions 
that trigger communication are successful enforcements. If Ro for 
the activity is extremely low so that enforcements are rare and com-
munication, consequently, is sporadic, M for the offense might ap-
proach zero even ·though RP for the offense is positive or even high. 
At any given time, t, there will be an existing level of socio-
pedagogical influence at work in the society. That level will be some 
function of the norm-developing messages communicated in the past 
by enforcements and punishments. However, socio-pedagogical in-
fluences will be a function not of the total effective message sent out 
in each prior time period, 40 but rather of the changes in the content 
and intensity of the message that have occurred over time. It is the 
alterations in the effective message, caused either by changes in the 
Re and RP ratios for the offense or by changes in the effectiveness 
of communication, that both reflect changes in society's disapproval 
ranking of the prohibited activity and indicate changes in the norms 
that society wishes to foster. Thus, the socio-pedagogical influence 
(Da) in any time period tis some function, f, of the changes in the 
message it:hat were made in the prior period plus the level of Da that 
was operating in that prior period. This can be expressed as: 
- QM oM oM) Dat- D31;_1 + f ~k + ~ + ~ (11) 
t-1 et-1 Pt-1 
39. Because effective communication and enforcement levels are neither function• 
ally related nor dependent upon the same factors, they will not move together. Com-
munication may be increased by triggering occasions, but R. depends upon enforce-
ment resource allocation, not the number of successful enforcements. 
40. This total message merely reinforces present levels of D8• 
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where 
1r + ~~ + :~ ) = the change in message in time t-1; 
~ t-1 t-1 Pt-1 
f~r + ~~ + ~~ ) = ADat-i• the change in socio-peda-
~ t-1 8 t-1 Pt-1 gogical influence between times t 
and t-1. 
But, 
D -D f~M oM oM) 8t-l - 8t-2 + ~k + on + ;rn:-
t-2 ~t-2 Pt-2 
(12) 
Thus, socio-pedagogical influence at any time t is the sum of the 
ADa's from all prior times: 41 
D =S.ttf oM dk + oM dRe+ oM dRPJdt (l3 ) 3
t O [ok dt oRe dt oRp dt 
From (10), we know 
oM = k· oM = k· oM - (R + R ) 
oRe ' oRe ' ok e P • 
Therefore, 
Dat s:t~E!~9 + k~~~9 + (Re + Rp) ~~ jdt (14) 
The model thus suggests that socio-pedagogical influences at any time 
are a function of the sum of past changes in society's rankings of the 
prohibited activity to the extent that ,they are communicated, 
k0~~ + kE :~~• and the increase or decrease in the portion 
of the message existing at any time that is effectively communicated, 
[(Re + Rp)~f]. 
This model of the development of socio-pedagogical influences 
over time indicates clearly that enforcement and punishment efforts in 
any period are both a present consumption, in that they contribute to 
current prevention efficacy, and an investment, in that they yield 
returns in the form of {uture prevention efficacy. In considering 
whether punishment and enforcement policies will be sufficiently 
beneficial to justify their costs, it therefore is important to consider 
the investment returns on the current expenditures. 
. oDa oM oM oM 
41. Assuming .lM, -R, -R, - > O. 
u O O O p Ok 
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By substituting (14) into (8), the final form of the general 
framework is obtained: 
7r = Fb · B - ~(Fod 'Foe)P + k(Fod+Foe) S + 
where J,f~0f + :-J + (R, + R;)~f]) (15) 
Resource input point ( 1) = P; 
Resource input point (2) = Fod, Foe; 
dk Resource input point (3) = k, dt. 
C. Implications of the Model and Completion of the Framework 
The model of general prevention just developed places the ele-
ments of prevention into perspective and identifies the resource input 
points. In so doing, it facilitates determining how resources, added 
at given resource input points, influence the individual's resource 
allocation decision. There are three resource input groups: (1) 
resources necessary to apply the legally designated punishment, such 
as the costs of maintaining a prison system or of imposing fines; (2) 
detection, enforcement, and prosecutorial resources, which directly 
determine the objective probabilities of apprehension and punish-
ment; and (3) resources expended upon effective communication and 
publicity, which directly contribute to the perceived probabilities and 
facilitate the development of socio-pedagogical influences. The gen-
eral model indicates that these three resource input groups potentially 
have multiple outputs in the total prevention plan. Resources added 
at the first input point contribute both to primary general deterrence 
and to the message for socio-pedagogical influences. Resources added 
at the second point strengthen primary and secondary general 
deterrence and are also a portion of the socio-pedagogical message. 
Resources added at the third point alter the perceived probabilities of 
primary and secondary general dete.rrence and control the effective-
ness of the socio-pedagogical message, which is created by the ex-
penditure of resources at the first two points. 
The model also indicates certain bottlenecks in a total prevention 
plan that affect the efficiency of particular resource uses. Resources 
devoted to the maintenance of punishments and to the development 
of objective probabilities will be much less productive without effec-
tive communication. Without the expenditure of resources to main-
tain significant objective probabilities, the maintenance of institutions 
for imposing punishments, such as prisons, may consume resources 
while hardly benefiting prevention efficacy. Efforts to increase a 
April 1976] Allocation of Prevention Resources 995 
particular elemental probability, which would contribute to the total 
objective probability that primary general deterrent costs will be 
imposed, will be inefficient if the other elemental probabilities are 
extremely low.42 These observations suggest limitations upon the 
range of resource combinations that will efficiently contribute to a 
prevention plan. 
Finally, the model shows that prevention resource expenditures 
contribute to both present and future preventive efficacy. Resources 
allocated to implementing punishments and developing objective 
probabilities have immediate preventive effects and, in addition, yield 
future returns in so far as they develop the norms underlying socio-
pedagogical influences. A communication system designed to main-
tain the effectiveness of socio-pedagogical influences is an investment. 
This interaction of present and future benefits indicates the import-
ance of long-range planning and the need ;to consider future returns 
when deciding whether a resource use will produce benefits •sufficient 
to justify its cost. 
The model takes on its full predictive powers only when, for the 
prohibited activity under consideration, empirical assumptions are 
made about the elasticity of total counter-motivations (C) with re-
spect to each of the variables-communication, objective probabili-
ties, punishment levels, etc. The making of assumptions essen-
tially requires a determination of the most influential variables, those 
variables that will cause the greatest increase in C for a given resource 
input. Variables ·that cause a greater change in C will Teduce 7r to 
zero more efficiently-that is, with less resource cost. 
It is at this point appropriate to complete the framework of 
prevention resource allocation by considering more concretely the 
second resource allocation decision of concern in the framework-the 
efficient allocation of social resources to prevention. While the dis-
cussion thus far has focused on placing the individual's allocation 
decision in a more concrete form, it has indirectly dealt with the 
question of efficiently allocating prevention resources. Thus, while 
equation (15) is an embodiment of the individual's allocation deci-
sion, it is also the objective function for societal resource allocation; 
society desires to reduce (15) to zero. Furthermore, the concrete 
form of the general prevention model facilitates recognition of the 
resource input points and indicates the multiple impact of some 
resource inputs. 
The objective in developing this framework for the allocation of 
prevention resources is not to determine how to prevent a person from 
engaging in a prohibited activity at any cost, but rather to plan an 
effective prevention mechanism at the lowest possible social cost.43 
42. See text following note 29 supra. 
43. "Social cost" includes the expenditure of all social resources, both tangible 
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The goal in using the framework, accordingly, is to minimize social 
costs, K, subject to the constraint that 7r = 0, that is, that the typical 
individual is deterred. Although deterrence also exists at 7r < 0, it is 
inefficient to expend resources to achieve that result if persons are 
effectively deterred by nullifying their benefits. 
The minimum cost necessary to achieve effective deterrence, de-
termined from the general prevention model, may be unreasonably 
high for a particular offense. There will be some maximum cost, K*, 
that society is willing to incur to achieve effective prevention. That 
maximum cost will presumably be the social harm that would result 
from the occurrence of the prohibited activity, since a society will not 
want to expend more resources on preventing an offense than the 
resource cost it would incur if the offense were committed. 
Society has two possible options if the minimum cost of effective 
prevention exceeds K*. One option is to forgo spending resources on 
prevention and, instead, spend resources on redressing the injuries of 
the offense victims. The other option, which may or may not be 
feasible, is to devise a resource allocation plan with the objective of 
deterring only some of the potential offenders. The general preven-
tion model developed above assumes one typical individual who 
decides whether to violate a particular proscription. But some pro• 
hibited activities may actually have subgroups of violators, each with 
its typical representative, who may be more susceptible to societal 
prevention efforts than the offender that is typical of all violators of 
the offense. In such instances, it may be possible to design preven-
tion plans at less than K* costs to deter members of such subgroups 
while other potential violators go undeterred. Thus, the purpose of 
this second option is to discover "cheaper prohibited act avoiders." 
The individual who is influenced only by a full-time policeman at his 
elbow is left to engage in prohibited activity, although obviously this 
fact is not announced to him. 
The model of general prevention indicated that prevention ex-
penditures are an investment as well as a present consumption. This 
in turn implies that consideration must be given in resource allocation 
decisions to the future returns on the investment. To avoid eroding 
an investment built over time and capable of yielding future returns, 
prevention policy decisions should be made so as to avoid reducing 
existing levels of socio-pedagogical influences. It is likely that any 
resource savings resulting from a decision not to maintain existing 
socio-pedagogical influences would be less than the future returns 
that could be expected from Da. 44 
and intangible. Intangible costs might be human suffering or the lowering of ethical 
standards. 
44. This assertion may not be true for all offenses and, indeed, is merely a rebut-
table presumption in the absence of empirical data for specific activities. Thus, in 
allocating resources for the prevention of all prohibited activities, it might properly 
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Socio-pedagogical influences are eroded by any negative change in 
D3 over a time period. The requirement that a prevention plan not 
erode D3 can therefore be expressed as a final constraint on the 
framework: The change in D3 ( b.D3) must be greater than or 
equal to zero. For purposes of this Note, it is assumed that this 
constraint does apply. 
In its final form, the general framework for the allocation of 
prevention resources can thus be formulated as follows: 
Costs (K) must be minimized subject to the requirements, that 
( 1) ,,. = 0 ( deterrence be achieved) 
(2) k E:~e + :~P1 + Qle + R~ ~~> O (socio-pedagogical in-
fluences not be eroded) 
and, implicitly, 
(3) K ~ K* (the resource cost of deterrence be less than the re-
source cost associated with occurrence of the offense). 
ill. SPECIFIC .APPLICATION 
In this part, 1:he usefulness of the general framework in making 
resource allocations is illustrated by applying it to a specific prob-
lem-insider trading in corporate securities. 45 
A. An Overview of Insider Trading 
Insider trading refers to the use of nonpublic information46 in 
purchasing or selling personal holdings of corporate securities so as to 
make a profit or to prevent a loss.47 Typically, this trading is done 
by corporate officers or directors in the securities of their own firms, 
be concluded that more social benefit could be gained from allowing the erosion of 
socio-pedagogical influences· for activity A and allocating the freed resources to the 
prevention of activity B. 
45. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970), represents 
a congressional determination that insider trading should be prevented. That provi-
sion was based on the belief that efficiency in the capital markets is furthered by 
investor confidence, which is prompted through fair markets without insider trading. 
See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934). 
Some commentators argue that insider trading furthers market efficiency because 
it results in the more accurate and rapid market reflection of actual stock values. See 
H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND TIIE STOCK MARKET (1966); Wu, An Economist 
Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 260 
(1968). A societal desire to prevent insider trading is presumed in this Note, as is 
the existence of sufficient social costs associated with unrestrained insider tradjng to 
justify the use of resources in its prevention. This, of course, does not mean that 
any amount of resource cost would be justified. 
46. Such information may include, for example, news of a forthcoming merger, 
a tender offer, unusual earnings figures, or the development of a new product. 
47. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); w. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 
2-3 (1968). 
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but any person profiting through trading in the stock of any corpora-
tion by using nonpublic information is an inside trader.48 
Present regulation and enforcement policies concerning insider 
trading are contained in sections 16 and 10 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,49 SEC rules 16(a), 16(b), and lOb-560 and the 
relevant SEC and court interpretations. 51 Under section 16(b ), any 
officer, director, or controlling shareholder of a corporation who sells 
and purchases (or purchases and sells) stock of his company within a 
six-month period is conclusively presumed52 to have traded on the 
basis of inside information and is held liable to his corporation for the 
profits he realizes and the losses he avoids. Section lO(b) and rule 
l0b-5 are broader and more imprecise than section 16(b): They 
prohibit fraudulent and deceitful activities in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.53 In general, section 16(b) protects 
a corporation and its shareholders against insider trading by the 
corporation's officers, directors, and controlling shareholders, while 
rule 1 0b-5 protects investors against insider trading in general. 64 
Due to its relatively unambiguous design and its lack of any 
scienter requirement, section 16(b) serves as a stiff deterrent for a 
very limited portion of insider trading. The objective six-month test 
allows plaintiffs to avoid the problem of proving that a defendant 
officer, director, or ten-per-cent shareholder made actual use of any 
inside information available to him. Section 16(a)56 facilitates the 
enforcement of 16(b) by requiring each individual, upon becoming 
an insider, to report any holdings of his company's securities and to 
report any changes in those holdings each month. Enforcement is also 
facilitated by a provision allowing either the corporation directly or its 
48. See W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 2-3. 
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(b), 78j (1970). 
50. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16a-1 to -10 (1974); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-1 to -11 
(1974); 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1974). 
51. Where broker-dealers are involved, a rule lOb-5 claim is usually joined with 
claims under rule 15cl-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1974), or Section 17(a) of the 
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970), for good measure. See L. Loss, SECURITIES REG-
ULATION 1449 (student ed. 1961). 
52. Exceptions to this objective test have been promulgated to avoid automatic 
liability where a conclusive presumption would be harsh and disrupt market functions. 
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-1 to -11 (1974). 
53. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1974): 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange, 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security. 
54. See W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 8-23. 
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970). See L. Loss, supra note 51, at 1038-40. 
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shareholders derivatively to sue for the insider's profits, 56 and by the 
judicial abrogation of both security-for-expenses requirements57 and 
requirements that the plaintiff be a stockholder at the time of the 
wrong. 58 To provide an additional incentive for the civil enforce-
ment of section 16(b), courts allow plaintiffs to subtract counsel fees 
from the recovered profits in amounts ranging from one-quarter to 
one-half of the total. 59 
Thus, section 16(b) has been designed to ensure its vigorous 
enforcement. Perfect ease of enforcement has been hampered, how-
ever, by interpretative uncertainties that remain. In particular, it is 
unclear whether the terms "purchase and sale" or "sale and purchase" 
cover unusual situations such as the conversion of preferred stock or 
stock exchanges occurring in connection with mergers. 6° Courts 
apparently follow one of two approaches in deciding whether a 
transaction is a "purchase and sale'' for ,the purpose of section 16 (b). 
The objective approach-applying the section in a mechanical man-
ner even where no wrong is apparent-is based on the theory that 
Congress accepted the danger of subjecting the innocent to 16(b) 
liability in order to obtain maximum deterrence. The pragmatic ap-
proach-applying 16(b) only to those transactions involving some 
actual danger of abuse of inside information-has also been fol-
lowed. 61 Uncertainties such as this have tempered the strong preven-
tion influence embodied in the section's mechanical six-month test. 
Rule lOb-5, the basis today for a broad and uncertain concept of 
insider liability, was originally conceived as a general anti-fraud 
provision without any particular application to insider trading. 62 The 
rule standing alone therefore did not have a preventive effect upon 
insider trading until courts decided to specifically apply it to insider 
trading and concluded that the rule provided individuals with a private 
damage action for violations of its prohibitions. 63 In the 1 0b-5 con-
56. Shareholders must first request that the corporation bring the suit. If it fails 
to do so within 60 days, the shareholders are automatically free to begin the deriva-
tive suit. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). 
57. See I.I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964); W. PAINTER, supra 
note 47, at 15. 
58. See L. Loss, supra note 51, at 1046. 
59. See id. at 1052; Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Ex-
change Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 421-22 & nn.142-43 (1953). 
60. See W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 42. 
61. See id. at41-52; id. at 10-14 (Supp. 1974). 
62. Id. at 19. 
63. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971); 
I.I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 
F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Note, SEC Rule JOb-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. 
& MARYL. REV. 860, 866 (1972). The courts have justified the implication of pri-
vate causes of actions in securities regulation by the need for more enforcement than 
the SEC can provide. See, e.g., I.I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964); 
Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Co., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 910 (1973). 
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text, courts expanded the narrow definition of insider trading con-
tained in 16(b) in order to cover situations in which material, nonpub-
lic, corporate information is used by any individual to disadvantage 
others in securities trading. 64 In devising the 1 0b-5 cause of action, 
courts eschewed requiring plaintiffs to comply with the traditional 
elements of a common-law fraud action6~ and allowed plaintiffs to 
recover attorney fees. 66 In so doing, they in effect enlisted private 
plaintiffs to supplement SEC enforcement efforts and thereby sub-
jected insiders to the dangers of incurring huge liabilities to large 
numbers of investors. 67 
Section 16(b) and rule lOb-5 have thus, over the past several 
decades, taken different approaches to the problem of insider trading. 
Section 16 (b) has dealt with a very limited portion of insider 
trading by using a conclusive rule of liability and strong inducements 
to civil enforcement. Rule 1 0b-5 has dealt with the amorphous body 
of all insider trading via a case-by-case development of preventive 
influences. Because of their differences, 16(b) and l0b-5 can be 
viewed as comparative experiments in the prevention of insider trad-
ing. The data from these experiments can be used both to discover 
the effectiveness of past resource allocations and to determine whether 
resources might be better allocated for more effective prevention of 
insider trading. 
B. Characteristics and Motivations of the Typical Offender 
Before considering insider trading in light of the general frame-
work, it is appropriate to analyze the motivations of the "typical" 
inside trader that must be offset through the utilization of prevention 
resources. The essential characteristic of the potential inside trader is 
64. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); W. 
PAINTER, supra note 47, at 118, 222-23. 
65. See L. Loss, supra note 51, at 1435; The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 
HARv. L. REv. 50, 260 n.2, 270 (1972). The exact parameters for fraud that have 
been worked out in lOb-5 actions are not entirely clear. The reliance requirement 
of common-law fraud has apparently been weakened so as to approach a presumption 
of reliance in nondisclosure cases or situations of impersonal fraud on the market. 
See Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule l0b-5, 88 
HARv. L. REv. 584 (1975); Note, supra note 63, at 885-95. There has been relaxa-
tion of both scienter and materiality ,:equirements, see Note, supra note 63, at 867-
85; but see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 44 U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S. March 30, 1976) 
(No. 74-1042), and causation in fact, rather than the more stringent proximate cause, 
has been found adequate, see Note, supra note 63, at 892-99. Similarly, it is enough 
that the fraud occurred in connection with a purchase or sale; strict privity is not 
required. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). 
66. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970) (misleading 
proxy solicitation). 
67. See Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule l0b-5 Cases Involving Actively 
Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 385 (1974). 
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that he is capable of being deterred by affirmative enforcement 
policies. Recorded incidents of individuals who chose not to trade on 
inside information68 and of corporations that promulgated new dis-
closure policies and adopted intra-corporate sanctions for abuse of 
inside information69 make it difficult to contest the notion that some 
deterrence of insider trading is possible. 
As noted above, an inside trader is any person who obtains 
material nonpublic information about a corporation and proceeds to 
trade in that corporation's securities without first publicly disclosing 
the information. This definition potentially covers a broad range of 
people. Generally, however, the prevention system can be tailored 
for inside traders who are either corporate directors, controlling 
shareholders, top-level corporate managers, or members of the finan-
cial community who serve corporations as broker-dealers, underwrit-
ers, or analysts. Such individuals are likely to be executives or 
professionals from middle or upper socioeconomic groups. Accord-
ing to a survey by the Harvard Business Review, this means that their 
ethical decisions may be strongly influenced by their personal codes 
of behavior70 and that they may view a high probability of detection 
and punishment as an important counter-motivator.71 These gener-
alizations have several ramifications. First, inside traders may be 
strongly affected by socio-pedagogical influences if such influences 
can be well developed through clear definitional statements of the 
prohibited activity. 72 Second, in the development of socio-pedagogi-
cal influences, the most important element of the message, M, is likely 
to be Re-the willingness of society to invest resources in punishing 
68. For example, one officer of the failing Penn Central Railroad refused to sell 
the stock that represented nearly his entire personal fortune before its market price 
plummeted from $88.50 to $10 per share. Although he seems to have been deterred, 
one of his colleagues apparently was not: He traded and then attempted to cover 
his violation by requesting his bank to pretend to force his sale of stock to cover 
a loan. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1972, at 1, col. 2 (late city ed.). In another case, 
a securities analyst, after receiving potentially material inside information, refused to 
reveal it to a customer. Influenced by then current proceedings in the Equity Fund-
ing scandal, he felt it would certainly be considered a misuse of nonpublic material 
information. See Wall St. J., June 7, 1973, at 6, col. 3 (eastern ed.). At _least one 
commentator has concluded that "white-collar crime" is more easily deterred than 
other crime. See Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanc-
tions, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 703, 712-14. 
69. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 29, 1965, at 45, col. 7 (late city ed.); Wall St. 
J., Oct. 8, 1969, at 15, col. 1 (eastern ed.); id., May 4, 1965, at 16, col. 3 (eastern 
ed.); id., April 27, 1965, at 1, col. 6 (eastern ed.). 
70. Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, 39 HARV. Bus. REV. 6, 19, 156, 
158 (July-Aug. 1961). Although these generalizations are plausible, sufficient em-
pirical data do not presently exist to verify them completely. 
11. Id. at 19. It is still possible that business executives are less counter-moti-
vated by any given probability than other individuals since there is some very limited 
evidence that business executives may be more risk-preferring than other types of ad-
ministrators. See Brown, Risk Propensity in Decision -Making: A Comparison of 
Business and Public School Administrators, 15 Al>MIN. Ser. Q. 473, 476 (1970). 
12. See Baumhart, supra note 70, at 168, 170. 
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violators. Third, primary general deterrence, with counter-motiva-
tions in the form of fears of being caught, is the most important 
element of prevention. Finally, primary general deterrence may be 
closely followed in preventive influence by secondary general deter-
rence since the typical inside trader, an executive or professional, is 
likely to be sensitive to possibilities of shame and loss of reputation73 
and fearful of losing customers, clients, and employment opportuni-
ties. 74 
The generalization that the probability of detection and, thus, 
primary general deterrence (in which the probability of detection has 
its clearest impact) will be most influential in preventing insider 
trading is not surprising and probably does not distinguish the typical 
inside trader from other violators. However, sensitivity to secondary 
general deterrence may be an important distinguishing characteristic 
of inside traders. Obviously, these general characteristics can be little 
more than guidelines and more research and evidence would be 
helpful. 
The typical inside trader is motivated, presumably, by the desire 
for some financial benefit that he can expect to receive with some 
substantial probability. For purposes of analysis this motivation can 
be divided into two parts: the benefit desired by the inside trader 
and the probability that he will receive that benefit. 
In insider rtrading, benefits take the general form of financial gain 
or trading profits, but there are some variations. Broker-dealers and 
analysts who selectively tip to their customers may be motivated by 
financial gain, but such gain often comes indirectly in the form of 
contented, regular customers. Motivations for financial gain may 
vary in intensity depending upon whether the gain takes the form of 
avoiding a potential loss or ensuring a possible gain. When an 
insider is attempting to prevent a loss by selling out prior to an 
expected drop in stock value, his motivations may be stronger than 
when he is trading on an upswing in the hope of increasing his profits 
from investment. 75 Whatever the form, however, the motivation to 
be countered is the desire for wealth. 76 
73. A survey of businesspeople produced evidence that their fear of imprisonment 
stemmed from the danger to their reputations and the stigma that they associated 
with imprisonment. M. CLINARD, THE BLACK MARKET 243-44 (1952), See N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 5, 1972, at SO, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
74. Baumhart, supra note 70, at 10. 
15. Although, due to considerations of fairness, we probably would not want to 
place stronger primary general deterrent penalties upon those trading in downswings 
in order to offset the stronger motivation, secondary general deterrence might provide 
the extra counter-motivation in those cases. An insider who trades before a slump 
might be stigmatized more than one who traded on an upswing-something analogous 
to the captain taking the only lifeboat on a sinking ship. 
76. This fact alone suggests the counter-motivation most likely to be successful: 
deprivation of wealth. 
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The probability that the inside trader will receive his expected 
benefit is in general quite high. The 16(b) definition of insider 
trading, which requires both a sale and purchase or purchase and sale 
for completion of the prohibited act, ensures that the trader will 
receive the benefits when the prohibited act is carried out. For 
example, if a corporate director purchases stock with the expectation 
that it will rise in value and then sells the stock four months later, the 
violation occurs only upon the moment of sale. At that moment, the 
director knows precisely the amount of his profits and receives them 
very soon thereafter. If those benefits are substantial it will be very 
difficult to offset his motivation. 
In the more broadly defined transactions falling under rule lOb-5, 
the probability of benefit will vary and rarely will be as certain as in 
the 16(b) context. Under rule l0b-5, the initial transaction com-
pletes the prohibited act. The realization of the benefits, however, 
still depends upon the market's reacting as expected by the insider, 
which of course can never be predicted by the offender with complete 
certainty. Yet, a high probability of receiving the benefits can often 
be expected by the offender due to the very nature of the information 
used in making the decision to trade. Furthermore, the insider will 
certainly be successful in making the initial transaction because ready 
and willing "victims" exist. In other prohibited acts-burglary, for 
example--,there is no willing exchange between the perpetrator and 
the victim. In the context of insider trading, the open market pro-
vides a ready bargain and ensures a high probability of a successful 
transaction and of final receipt of the benefits. 77 In many insider 
trading cases, the market-injected uncertainty lowers not the probabil-
ity of receiving positive benefits but only the probability of receiving 
some exact amount of benefits. In such cases, the insider presumably 
associates a range of benefits and probabilities with any transaction, 
but can be virtually ce_rtain that his benefits will fall within that range. 
In sum, the financial nature of the potential benefits and the 
inside trader's, high probability of receiving those benefits create 
strong motivations for an insider transaction and present a strong 
challenge to any prevention scheme. 
C. Primary General Deterrence and Insider Trading 
Most resource expenditures for the prevention of insider trading 
have probably been made in the area of primary general deterrence.78 
77. This may not be true with regard to the stock of small, closely held corpora-
tions. 
78. Although resource expenditures on Fop and P in primary general deterrence 
should theoretically also impact on socio-pedagogical influences and secondary gen-
eral deterrence, these expenditures, in fact, have not been made in a manner to influ-
ence effectively the other two elements of prevention. See text at notes 142-44 in-
fra. 
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Thus, resources have been devoted ,to the application of penalties 
( e.g., fines, civil damages, injunctions, suspension of broker-dealer 
registrations), to detection aids such as the numerous government 
publications and the policing of the 16(a) reports, and to the various 
private and SEC investigation and enforcement efforts. 
This apparent high reliance upon primary general deterrence can 
be justified for rtwo reasons. First, as noted above, the typical 
potential inside trader is probably most strongly counter-motivated by 
primary general deterrence. That is, a given resource allocation to 
primary general deterrence (D1) will increase total counter-motiva-
tions (C) more than will an identical quantity of resources devoted to 
secondary general deterrence or socio-pedagogical influences70 and 
will thus make a larger contribution to the reduction of 1r ,to zero. 80 
Second, the efficient creation of primary general deterrent punish-
ments is facilitated in the insider trading context by the availability 6£ 
a penalty-the direct deprivation of economic gain-that can be 
tailored to offset accurately the offender's benefit from offending. 
Indeed, in 16(b) actions the offender's penalty-regurgitation of his 
profits-automatically equals his benefit. The availability of this 
remedy allows society to offset the offender's benefit without overex-
pending or underexpending resources-a result that occurs in apply-
ing penalties ,that poorly approximate the offender's benefits. More-
over, it means that the potential offender is likely to be strongly coun-
ter-motivated: He will expeot the penalty he receives to deprive him 
of his benefits since he will expect the penalty to change in line with 
any change in his benefits. It is more difficult in ,the context of other 
offenses to design such automatically individualized punishments be-
cause it is impossible to determine whether, for example, five years of 
imprisonment counters the gains from ,three years of embezzlement 
either for the typical offender or for a particular offender. 
Different approaches have been taken to the creation of primary 
general deterrent counter-motivations in the 16(b) and lOb-5 con-
texts. Accordingly, it is possible to evaluate the merits and shortcom-
ings of these approaches to primary general deterrence by examining 
the past experience. 
-1. Section J6(b): The Costs of Total Reliance 
The enforcement of section 16(b) has relied almost solely, and 
79. This is particularly true if the resources are applied to detection efforts since 
the probability of detection is particularly influential to a businessperson. See text 
at notes 70-71 supra. 
80. However, this does not necessarily justify the a11ocation of a11 prevention re-
sources to D 1• If the marginal return to resources employed in D 2 and D8 is posi-
tive, and if diminishing marginal returns to resources devoted to D1 is assumed, then 
at some point a greater increase in C can be obtained by shifting resources to D2 
and 0 8• 




quite effectively, 81 on primary general deterrence. It has done so, 
however, only at significant cost. 
The effectiveness of primary general deterrence in 16 (b) cases 
can be seen by e:ir:aroinine equation (15) witb.oull: ithe variables for 
secondary general deteDrence and socio-pedagogical influence: 
'Ir = Fb • B - [k(Fod • Foe)P] (16) 
The probability of receiving the benefits (Fb) will be nearly equal 
to one since, as noted above, the 16(b) offense does not occur until 
both the purchase and sale ( or sale and purchase) take place. Since 
the penalty for violating 16(b) is equal to the amount of the offend-
er's benefit, P = B. Consequently we have 
0 = 'Ir = B - k(Fod • Foe)B (17) 
which reduces to 
0 = B[l - k(Fod · Foe)] (18) 
Clearly, if k(Fod • Foe) = 1 (that is, if -the perceived probability of 
punishment is equal to one), the right hand side will reduce to zero 
and sufficient counter-motivations will theoretically have been sup-
plied by primary general deterrence. 82 
The probability that an offender will be punished, (Pod · Foe), for 
a 16 (b) violation has been brought very close to one through a 
combination of procedural and reporting techniques. The publica-
tion of the section 16(a) mandatory reports of all sales and purchases 
by insiders of their companies' securities, coupled with the allowance 
of attorney fees in 16(b) actions, has provided the means and the 
incentive for private detection of 16(b) violations and has thus raised 
81. Some commentators, however, have argued that section 16(b) has not been 
successful. See H. MANNE, supra note 51, at 163-64; Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A 
New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CoRNELL L. R.Bv. 45, 64 (1968); Com-
ment, Section 16(b): Re-evaluation ls Needed, 25 U. MIAMI L R.Bv. 144, 159 
(1970). Others believe that section 16(b) has had precisely the deterrent effect that 
its framers intended. See L. Loss, supra note 51, at 1043; W PAINTER, supra note 
47, at 16, 25. The specific definition of insider trading in section 16(b) has been 
successful in deterring that very specific type of violation. The section has certainly 
prevented trading based on inside information that has only a short-lived effect on 
market prices. Surely the specific language of section 16(b) cannot be expected to 
prevent insider trading in general. 
82. Equation (18) in the text then becomes 
0 = B[l - 1 • 1] = 0 
and the net benefit has been reduced to zero. This assumes k = 1, i.e., that levels 
of communication were such that business executives knew the probabilities and pen-
alties under section 16(b). However, k = 1 is plausible since procedures that result 
in high probabilities were either clear on the face of the statute or were made clear 
in early enforcements. Since hundreds of insiders report under section Hi(a), it is 
likely that they are apprised of the outline and extent of section 16(b). See SEC, 
OFFICIAL SUMMARY OF SECURITY TRANSACTIONS AND HOI.DINGS (1935-1975). Pub-
licity given to early cases also serv~d to reinforce the business community's aware-
ness of the statutory provisions. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 21, 1965, at 63, col. 
4 (late city ed.). 
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Fod to nearly one. 83 The probability of enforcement following dis-
covery (Foe) is essentially equal to one since the mechanical six.-
month rule and the lack of a scienter requirement have eased the 
burden of proof and since the allowance of derivative actions and of 
generous counsel fees84 has ensured a large pool of willing plaintiffs. 
In short, Fod and Foe are both very close to one in the 16 (b) 
context. This fact and the fact noted above, that the typical inside 
trader is likely to be susceptible to high Fod and Foe probabilities, BG 
explain the success of primary general deterrence in the 16(b) con-
text. 
The 16(b) success in using only primary general deterrent counter-
motivations, however, has in several respects been achieved only at 
substantial cost. First, the mechanical six-month rule, which has 
created a high Fod and Foe, excludes many individuals who engage 
in undesirable insider trading from the reach of section 16(b). An 
insider's use of inside information is no less unfair simply because he 
did not use it in a quick six-month purchase and sale transaction. 
Section 16(b) could have avoided a six-month limit in favor of 
prohibiting insider trading whenever it occurs. 
Second, costs result from the lack of any requirement in 16(b) 
that defendants have actually used inside information in their transac-
tions. While the lack of such a requirement has doubtless raised Fod 
and Foe, the result is -that persons totally innocent of actual abuse of 
inside information are caught in the rigid rule of 16(b) and are 
forced to regurgitate honestly acquired profits and expend substantial 
sums on legal fees. 86 This practice is costly to society, as well as to 
the individual defendants, for it absorbs prevention resources that 
could better be expended on prosecuting those outside the reach of 
16(b) who abuse inside information. 
Third, the simplified problems of proof and the automatic allow-
ance of attorney fees have encouraged a group of plaintiffs' attorneys 
to follow a practice bordering upon champem:y that is highly undesir-
83. There is obviously an incentive not to file section 16(a) reports if one has 
traded, and the SEC has only recently threatened to impose sanctions on delinquent 
filers. See Wall St. J., March 7, 1973, at 21, col. 4 (eastern ed.). In many com-
panies, however, internal company pressures applied by in-house counsel may force 
the insider to file. There is therefore reason to believe that that Fo4 is still close 
to one. If the statute of limitations were changed or interpreted to run from the fil. 
ing of the section 16(a) report rather than from "the date such profit was realized," 
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), at least one incentive for not filing would be removed. 
See Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). 
84. See text at notes 55-59 supra. 
85. See text at note 71 supra. 
86. The judicial development of a pragmatic approach to section 16(b) cases, 
wherein courts look for actual abuse of inside information, see, e.g., Kem County 
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), is probably evidence 
that innocent parties have been caught by the automatic application of the section, 
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able87 and that has probably increased the litigation of borderline or 
even frivolous cases. 
2. Rule 1 0b-5: The Problems and Some Proposals 
Rule l0b-5 avoids the rigid rules of section 16(b) and thereby 
avoids many of the costs incurred by 16(b)'s attempt to maximize 
Fod and Foe. Yet, while 1 0b-5 has avoided these costs, it has 
encountered other problems in its implementation of primary general 
deterrence. This section considers these problems and suggests some 
changes in resource utilization to alleviate them. 
Primary general deterrence is frustrated in the 1 0b-5 context by 
the imposition on an offender of penalties unrelated to the offender's 
benefits from a violation. The tendency has been to impose unduly 
harsh or unduly lenient penalties ranging from those that would 
bankrupt most individuals and many corporations88 to virtually 
meaningless injunctions or censures. 89 While the former penalties 
may have a terrifying preventive effect, the latter penalties have more 
often been applied. 90 
The lack of correspondence between penalties and the offenders' 
benefits stems principally from limitations upon the SEC, the- main 
enforcement agency for rule 1 0b-5. This agency is limited in the 
penalties it can dispense or seek through court action91 and thus has 
been forced to rely heavily upon injunctions. Yet, since an injunction 
obviously has no quality of automatic individualization to the viola-
tor's level of benefits, and indeed cannot be individualized, it is rarely 
a useful penalty for primary general deterrence. When the insider 
receives no benefits from offending, as in a pure tipper case, 92 an 
injunction may be appropriate as a remedy. The nonexistence of any 
81. See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 782-83 (S.D.N.Y. 
1956); L. Loss, supra note 51, at 1053; W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 16. 
88. See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of 
Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 423, 427-29 
(1968). The Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation involved almost 100 actions seeking mil-
lions of dollars in damages. See Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1969, at 15, col. 1 (eastern ed.). 
89. See, e.g., Wall St. J., April 30, 1973, at 8, col. 2 (east.em ed.). The SEC 
has recently recognized that a more comprehensive set of penalties is needed that are 
not entirely "all-or-nothing" sanctions. See id. Jan. 28, 1972, at 2, col. 3 (eastern 
ed.). See, e.g., id., June 11, 1974, at 2, col. 2 (eastern ed.) (censure rather than 
injunction). 
90. See, e.g., Wall St. J., May 29, 1973, at 10, col. 3 (eastern ed.); id., Sept. 29, 
1972, at 5, col. 1 (eastern ed.). 
91. The Commission may request a civil injunction against "acts or practices 
which constitute or will constitute a violation or' the Exchange Act and may also 
request the Department of Justice to begin a criminal prosecution. Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). Administrative remedies 
are also available, including expulsion of members from self-regulatory bodies, Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(h), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(h)(3) (Supp. 1976), and 
censure of investment advisers, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e) (Supp. 1976). 
92. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1972, at 5, col. 1 (eastern ed.). 
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present benefits in such a case avoids the need to formulate a penalty 
that offsets the offender's benefits, and the injunction serves as a 
future specific deterrent influence on the particular insider. When 
the insider does benefit from offending, however, an injunction serves 
virtually no primary general deterrent purpose as a penalty. A 
potential inside trader will see no counter-motivation in the possibility 
of being enjoined from doing something that, when the injunction is 
imposed, he will already have done and may not plan to do again. 
Since inside trading is normally triggered by unusual events in the life 
of a corporation,93 events that may never reoccur, the potential inside 
trader is unlikely to view an injunction as ever restricting his activi-
ties. 
The threat of an injunction might serve as an effective counter-
motivation for members of the financial and investment communities 
who engage in benefit-generating, inside trading violative of rule 
l0b-5, but even among such offenders it is rarely an appropriate one. 
When interpreted as a felony or misdemeanor conviction under 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-9(a)(l), an injunction serves to prohibit the offender's 
association with any investment company, investment adviser, or 
investment bank for ten years94 unless the offender receives an exemp-
tion from the SEC. 95 Since the injunction, when so interpreted and 
when no exemption is granted, is a very substantial penalty, it should 
be reserved for offenders who commit flagrant violations and receive 
great benefits or for offenders who show a pattern of continuous 
violation. 
Fortunately, the SEC has been able to apply or have the courts 
apply penalties that have a sufficient relation to the offender's bene-
fits. A combination of injunctive relief and the regurgitation of the 
offender's profits (or some approximation thereof) can successfully 
offset the benefits of offending,96 much as under 16(b). In cases 
involving broker-dealers, investment advisers, and affiliates of invest-
ment companies, penalties may take the form of injunctions coupled 
with either registration suspensions or temporary prohibitions of asso-
ciation with any broker-dealer, investment company, investment ad-
93. These include mergers, tender offers, ore discoveries, or the creation of new 
products. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843-44 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968). 
94. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a)(l) (1970). Many insiders who are associated with 
these members of the financial community will consent to injunctions that specific-
ally state there is to be no inference of wrongdoing in order to avoid having been 
"convicted." See, e.g., Wall St. J., June 4, 1973, at 3, col. 1 (eastern ed.). 
95. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(c) (1970). See, e.g., Wall St. J., April 30, 1973, p. 8, 
col. 2 (eastern ed.) (temporary exemption granted). 
96. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 ( 1971) (injunctions issued; insider defendants paid their 
profits into escrow fund for possible payment to investors); Wall St. J., Oct, 9, 1972, 
at 4, col. 4 (eastern ed.) (two defendants ordered to disgorge profits of $28,000 and 
$14,950; permanent injunctions against future violations issued), 
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viser, etc.97 Such penalties doubtless result in financial losses 
for those upon whom they are imposed. If the length of the sus-
pension and the consequent financial loss actually bear some rela-
tionship to the offender's benefits, these penalties may be suffi-
cient counter-motivations without any regurgitation of profits to per-
sons who may not actually have sustained a loss as a result of the 
offense. Typically, however, suspensions are for twenty, thirty, sixty, 
or ninety days,98 which suggests that they are set with little if any 
regard to the offender's financial gain. A suspension for a period of 
time calculated to offset the offender's gain through lost salary or lost 
business profits would be more effective in terms of primary general 
deterrence and would require virtually no additional enforcement 
resource expenditures. 
Enforcement of rule lOb-5 is conducted by private individuals as 
well as by the SEC. The penalties resulting from private enforce-
ment, however, also frequently bear little relation to the offender's 
benefit and thus show little concern for effective, efficient prevention. 
Many of the penalties are related more to the plaintiff's loss than to 
the defendant's gain, which may be desirable in terms of redressing 
legitimate injuries but which is inefficient in terms of primary general 
deterrence. If the suit takes the form of a derivative action with the 
damage recovery going to the corporation whose stock has· been 
traded, a penalty equal to the offender's profits is appropriate.99 
However, suits are also brought by investors demanding lost opportu-
nity damages equal to the gains they might have made by trading in a 
market in which the inside information was widely known.100 The 
recovery in such suits could be huge and could bear no relationship to 
the offender's financial gains.101 For prevention purposes, these 
huge penalties are likely to be no more effective than penalties that 
simply offset the offender's benefits (assuming that all offenders are 
91. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(h) (Supp. 1976); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b)(2) 
(1970); 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e) (Supp. 1976). 
98. See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (20 days); N.Y. Times, 
June 2, 1973, at 38, col. 5 (late city ed.) (20 days); Wall St. J., June 4, 1973, at 
3, col. 1 (eastern ed.) (60 days). 
99. Some approximation of profits is obviously also appropriate. See, e.g., Wall 
St. J., May 14, 1974, at 21, col. 1 (eastern ed.). 
100. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). In this case, the investors who had sold after a mis• 
leading disclosure lost the opportunity for substantial profits when the market sky-
rocketed after a complete disclosure. The court awarded them the gain in stock value 
they might have relized in the first few days. 446 F.2d at 105. Any investor who 
traded in the market while the insiders were trading may be able to claim this rem-
edy. See Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws: 
The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 872, 894 
(1967). 
101. Of course, if the remedy were equivalent to benefits, each investor might re-
ceive only a fraction of a cent for each share he traded. See generally 2 A. BROM-
. BERG, SECURITIES LAW§ 7.6(e) (1974). 
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penalized), 102 while the prospect of such damages serves as an incen-
tive to much litigation at substantial social costs.103 
There are two additional aspects to the problem of setting penal-
ties so that they offset the offender's benefit from offending. The 
first deals with selection of the minimum penalty that should be 
demanded by the SEC in the settlement of an enforcement action. 
Decreasing the penalty in settlements decreases the efficacy of pre-
vention since some individuals might, as a result, conclude that 
they will retain some of their benefits from offending even if they 
are detected. Against this decline in preventive efficacy, however, 
must be weighed the preventive value of detecting and prosecuting 
other offenders with the resources freed by settling some cases prior 
to any lengthy hearings. Obviously, the final penalty settled upon is 
a matter of negotiation and will vary among individual cases. How-
ever, the SEC, in an attempt to settle, should lower penalties only to 
the point where the decrease in preventive efficacy caused by the 
decrease in the severity of the penalty is roughly offset by the gain in 
prev~ntive influence from employing freed enforcement resources to 
increase the probability that some enforcement will occur. It is not 
clear whether this balancing is presently being done by the SEC.104 
The other aspect to the problem of setting penalties deals with the 
increased purchase by insiders of insurance policies that pay both 
legal fees and damage awards if the holder is found to have violated 
rule l0b-5.105 These policies may be purchased by corporations fo.r 
their executives. If such purchases of insurance are allowed, the 
deterrent value of two counter-motivations-primary general deter-
rence and, in the form of legal fees, secondary general deterrence-
will be nuliified.106 An investment of SEC resources to effect the 
102. That these huge penalties are likely to be superfluous is shown here. It has 
been shown that 
11' = Fb • B -[Fpp • Pl 
Even if these penalties are only three times the benefits, i.e., P = 3B, and even if 
the perceived probability of punishment, FPP, is only one half the probability of bene-
fit, i.e., F2 , the effects of primary general deterrence will be superfluous, without 
even considering the other preventive influences: 
1r = FB • B - ~ • (3B) 
1r = FB • B - 3/2 (Fb • B) 
1r = FB • B [1 -3/2] 
1r = -1/2 (Fb • B) 
103. See Note, supra note 63, at 939. 
104. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 2, 1973, at 38, col. S (late city ed.); id., Nov. 
10, 1972, at 53, col. 1 (late city ed.); Wall St. J., May 14, 1974, at 21, col. 1 (eastern 
ed.); id., June 4, 1973, at 3, col. 1 (eastern ed.). Although exact measurements can-
not, of course, be made, some effort at analytical judgments should be attempted. 
105. See Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1968, at 1, col. 1 (eastern ed.). 
106. It is not clear whether insurance and indemnification by the corporation is 
April 1976] Allocation of Prevention Resources 1011 
passage of legislation prohibiting indemnification and insurance, at 
least with respect to damage awards, would therefore be worthw~ile. 
Even apart from the penalty problems, primary general deter-
rence in the 1 0b-5 context is frustrated by the great difficulty of 
maintaining the probability of detection and, to a lesser degree, the 
probability of enforcement at high or even minimally adequate levels. 
While this difficulty is inherent in the secretive nature and ill-defined 
reach of the offense, there are, as discussed below, resource alloca-
tions and reallocations society can make that would ameliorate the 
problem. 
It is extremely difficult in the l0b-5 context to induce in potential 
offenders any substantial expectation of detection. Insider trading is 
very hard to notice unless conducted on a large scale since market 
traders are willing to become unknowing victims. Consequently, 
constant vigilance and investigation is necessary just to know that a 
prohibited trade has occurred, let alone to determine the identity of 
the insider. The probability of detection under rule lOb-5 is appar-
ently much lower than under 16 (b), where the detection problem was 
virtually removed by the reporting requirements of section 16(a).107 
Since no regulation or reporting form automatically brings violations 
to public attention, those enforcing lOb-5 must rely on the natural 
workings of the market. When insiders are trading a particular stock 
in any significant volume, the market price of the stock rises or falls. 
Accordingly, any market movement that precedes the announcement 
of some particular corporate occurrence creates grounds for investiga-
tion of possitsle insider trading. The SEC regularly depends upon 
these triggering events.108 But, in the case of large corporations with 
many shareholders, insider trading volume might not be heavy 
enough to cause detectable market movement. Thus, the SEC might 
not perceive that investigation was necessary. 
Discovery of the specific identity of the inside traders is an 
additional task even when the offending activity has been clearly 
legal. See Bishop, New Problems in Indemnifying and Insuring Directors: Protec-
tion Against Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1153, 
1157-58; Comment, Insider Indemnification and the Supremacy Clause: The Three 
Faces of Fraud, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 523, 543 (1968); Comment, Insuring Corporate 
Executives Against Liability Under I0b-5: First Principles and Second Thoughts, 63 
Nw. U. L. REV. 544, 563 (1968). 
107. See note 83 supra and accompanying text. 
108. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1973, at 10, col. 3 (eastern ed.) (36 per cent 
drop in stock prices in two days followed by the disclosure of disappointing quarter); 
id., Oct. 24, 1972, at 4, col. 3 (eastern ed.) (drop in prices before a release disclosing 
drop in earnings); id., Aug. 15, 1972, at 3, col. 2 (eastern ed.); id., Jan. 24, 1972, 
at 5, col. 1 (eastern ed.) (stock price jumped from $7 to $26 followed by disclosure 
of merger plans). Cf. 72 FoRTIJNE 69, 70 (1965) (two contradictory press releases 
triggered Texas Gulf Sulphur investigation). See generally Ferrara, SEC Division 
of Trading and Markets: Detection Investigation and Enforcement of Selected 
Practices That Impair Investor Confidence in the Capital Markets, 16 How. L.J. 950, 
980-81 (1971). 
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detected. The section 16(a) reporting forms can be helpful in 
detecting trades violative of lOb-5 by those insiders required to 
complete the forms, and new computerization methods may soon 
permit the SEC to obtain information on trades by insiders on the 
very day that they are made.109 However, there are still substantial 
possibilities for evading detection through the use of "street names" 
and secret accounts.110 The SEC is now trying to increase the 
probability of detection by implementing new enforcement policy rec-
ommendations.111 Efforts are also being made to conscript profes-
sionals associated with corporations and the financial world, such as 
lawyers and accountants, to serve as unofficial investigators under 
fear of sanctions.112 Unfortunately, however, the objective probabil-
ity of detection in the lOb-5 setting is still low. 
It has been less difficult to maintain a reasonably high probability 
that 1 Ob-5 violations, once detected, will be followed by successful 
enforcement efforts. Enforcement mechanisms under 1 Ob-5 are less 
automatic than under 16(b);113 thus, the probability of enforcement 
of lOb-5 violations does not approach one. Yet, a significant proba-
bility of enforcement (Foe) has been developed through the creation 
of incentives for private enforcement and through the enlargement of 
the class of potential enforcers. 
Two occurrences expanded the resource base available for en-
forcement of lOb-5 violations. One was the judicial inference of a 
private· right of action under 1 Ob-5, 114 which allowed private traders 
to supplement SEC enforcement efforts and increased the probability 
that someone, the SEC or an investor, would bring an enforcement 
action following the discovery of a violation.115 The other was the 
abandonment of the privity requirement. 116 Privity in securities 
transactions had tended to be very difficult to establish, particularly 
when sales on national exchanges were involved. The abandonment 
of the requirement therefore drastically increased the possible plaintiff 
class in a given situation by including any investor trading on the 
market in the same stock and at the same time that the offender was 
trading. This change, combined with the move toward less stringent 
109. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1972, at 63, col. 5 (late city ed.). 
110. See H. MANNE, supra note 45, at 163, 
111. See SEC, ADVISORY CoMM, ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, RE• 
PORT (1972), 
112. See Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 
49 N.Y.U. L. RBv. 437 (1974); Wall St. J,, July 12, 1974, at 1, col. 6 (eastern ed.). 
Some of these professionals are responding. See id. June 28, 1974, at 8, col. 1 (east• 
ern ed.). 
113. See text at notes 83-84 supra. 
114. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 101, § 2.4(1), at 27 & n.47 (1974). 
115. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,432 (1964). 
116. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 101, § 8.5(511), at 207; 1 id. § 2.5(3), at 
43. 
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reliance requirements, 117 has enabled plaintiffs to join together in 
class action suits and thereby overcome resource barriers to bringing 
enforcement actions. -
Along with recognizing a broader class of enforcement agents, the 
law under 1 0b-5 developed in a manner that implicitly provided 
incentives for individuals to bring private causes of action. Problems 
of proof, which had always been difficult in insider trading cases, 118 
were eased.119 This relaxation created a greater likelihood that a 
plaintiff would win an enforcement action and thus that he would be 
induced to bring it initially. Moreover, courts began to allow sub-
stantial damage recoveries and some attorney fees, 120 which made the 
investment of time and resources by the plaintiff and his counsel far 
more attractive. As a result of these developments, it is today very 
likely that some action will be taken, by the SEC or an investor, once 
a violation is detected. 
Thus, the objective probabilities of detection and enforcement in 
the lOb-5 area operate like an inverted funnel. Many cases never 
enter the funnel because of the narrow neck created by the low 
probability of detection. For those cases that enter the funnel, 
however, the probability of enforcement is substantial; thus, the 
funnel widens. It is significant that this relatively high probability of 
enforcement is apt to remain high even if the probability of detection 
increases and more offenders enter the enforcement process. In the 
normal case involving a fixed amount of resources at the enforcement 
stage, an increase in the probability of detection triggers a decrease in 
the probability of enforcement since resources are unavailable to 
bring actions against the additional offenders. In the 1 0b-5 context, 
the prospect of liberal damage recoveries and the substantial class of 
potential plaintiffs together create a readily available and expanding 
pool of enforcement resources and ensure a continued high probabil-
ity of enforcement. 
Thus, increased prevention efficacy under rule 1 0b-5 is depen-
dent upon an increase in the probability of detection. Society could 
solve the problem by devoting more resources to the detection of 
lOb-5 violators. Alternatively and probably less costly, however, soci-
ety could increase the communication factor, k, and thereby increase 
the probability as perceived by potential offenders. Members of the 
business and financial communities spend much of their time absorb-
ing information and are relatively susceptible to media messages.121 
117. See note 65 supra; 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 101, § 8.6, at 209. Reliance 
is implied in many cases through a finding of materiality. See Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
118. See, e.g., Smolowe v. Delendo, 136 F.2d 231,235 (2d Cir. 1943). 
119. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 101, § 2.5(4), at 44.2. 
120. See id. §§ 11.7, 913 (1968). 
121. "In an institution as naturally jittery as the stock market, publicity can be 
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This characteristic of potential 1 0b-5 offenders suggests the possibility 
of raising the perceived probabilities of detection and enforcement 
above the objective ones. 
A well-developed business media exists to facilitate direct com-
munication to potentially all inside traders in the business and finan-
cial communities. Members of these communities depend heavily 
upon data and information concerning businesses, markets, and 
trends and can be expected to read the appropriate newspapers and 
magazines with care. This factor distinguishes insider trading from 
many prohibited acts where no consistent exposure to the media 
necessarily exists. Furthermore, members of the business and finan-
cial communities often read more than one of the several business 
newspapers and periodicals. Since a single news story or announce-
ment is often carried by most of the publications, a potential inside 
trader may have multiple exposure to the fact that a particular 
enforcement has occurred.122 In short, the communication system to 
potential inside traders is well developed and needs no additional 
investment of resources. By using this excellent system of communi-
cation in a consistent and effective manner, the SEC can and app~ar-
ently has created the appearance of a higher probability of detection 
than actually exists. The SEC's announcement of large numbers of 
investigations and actions has led to the superstition that SEC investi-
gators lurk everywhere.123 These publications have been particularly 
effective with respect to Wall Street broker-dealers, but corporate 
insiders too are faced with headlines reading "SEC watchmen prowl a 
new beat"124 or "New blast on inside information."121S 
Thus, the SEC has to date made reasonably good use of the 
communication system. To increase the perceived probability of 
detection it should augment its communication efforts in that area. 
The one caveat is that the SEC should exercise caution in publicizing 
unsuccessful enforcement actions and actions resulting in virtually 
a very potent weapon. This week, the Securities & Exchange Commission moved 
against stock tips in the most sensational way possible when it charged Merrill Lynch . 
. • . " Bus. WEEK, Aug. 31, 1968, at 19. 
122. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1972, at 46, col. 4 (late city ed.); Wall St. 
J., Aug. 15, 1972, at 3, col. 2 (eastern ed.). 
123. Scarcely a day passes but that the SEC publishes the details of the revoca-
tion of a broker-dealer registration. 
The cumulative effect of these actions-accentuated by the widespread pub-
licity they received-has created an atmosphere in Wall Street that contains an 
element of fear. By its constant bustle of activity, the Commission has managed 
to nurture the Wall Street superstititon that there is an SEC investigator lurking 
around every comer. 
Phalon, The SEC vs. Wall Street, 81 DUN'S REV. & MODERN INDUS. 56, 57 (1963). 
Analysts, executives, and investors broke all sales records in purchasing Record Press 
reprints of the SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. court of appeals opinion. Wall St. 
J., Aug. 19, 1968, at 5, col. 3 (eastern ed.); Note, supra note 63, at 860. 
124. Bus. WEEK, May 7, 1966, at 53. 
125. Bus. WEEK, Aug. 31, 1968, at 19. 
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meaningless penalties, for such actions have ambiguous effects on the 
perceived probabilities of enforcement.126 
With regard to primary general deterrence in the l0b-5 context, 
then, major efforts are needed to raise the probability of detection, to 
design better and more consistent penalties, and to communicate 
carefully and forcefully. The first area of effort will require signifi-
cant new allocations of resources, but, since a low probability of 
detection serves as a bottleneck to returns on the use of other enforce-
ment resources, 127 such expenditures are important. Careful com-
munication directed at the perceived probability of detection may be 
capable of inducing a portion of the needed increase. The other two 
points of needed attention suggest solutions involving more of a 
qualitative change in the use of resources than massive additional 
resource input. 
D. Socio-Pedagogical Influence and Insider Trading 
The efficacy of socio-pedagogical influences in the prevention of 
insider trading is an area needing serious attention. Socio-pedagogi-
cal influences have been slow to develop and are still of limited 
effectiveness, largely due both to society's failure to invest in the 
necessary underlying norms years ago and to the uncertainty that has 
surrounded the definition of prohibited insider trading. 
In the insider trading context, socio-pedagogical influences and 
the underlying norms are weak due to the inherent difficulty of 
developing such norms, in the business community as well as in the 
general public, for economic legislation and business regulation. This 
difficulty is in turn due to the fact that the undesirability of activities 
covered by economic legislation, including insider trading, stems not 
from its immorality but rather from its unfairness-like playing poker 
with a marked deck. Unfairness does not develop fee~gs of 
126. On the one hand, startling enforcements such as Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), may have a preventive 
influence whether or not the SEC prevails: "Regardless of the outcome of the 
[Merrill Lynch] case, the fact that the action was taken has served notice on Wall 
Street that the SEC is not going to tolerate the misuse of inside information to the 
detriment of the small investor. There are indications that the practice already has 
been drastically curtailed, which means the little guy already is benefiting." Robards, 
Texas Gulf Sulphur, Merrill Lynch and All That, 123 MAGAZINE OF WALL Sr. Dec. 
7, 1968, at 29, 40. But many SEC enforcements do not result in real penalties. See, 
e.g., Wall St. J., June 11, 1974, at 2, col. 2 (eastern ed.) (censures); id., June 5, 1973, 
at 2, col. 2 (eastern ed.); id., May 29, 1973, at 10, col. 3 (eastern ed.) (consent 
decrees). These "nonenforcements" might actually lower the perceived probability 
of enforcement. For prevention purposes, the use of resources to investigate and be-
gin an action under these circumstances is wasted and highly inefficient. Of course, 
there may be other policies that in a particular case would call for lenient treatment. 
But the regular occurrence of meaningless penalties belies this justification, particu-
larly when couched vaguely in terms of the public interest. 
127. See text at note 42 supra. 
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"wrongness"-norms-as successfully as do overtones of immorality. 
The difficulty is compounded in the insider trading context because 
there is no agreement that insider trading is even unfair or harmful to 
market integrity. Henry Manne, for example, in his book Insider 
Trading and the Stock Market, argues that insider trading is a facili-
tator of more efficient markets and hence should not be prohibited.128 
The SEC seems to picture the prevention of insider trading as 
essentially an effort to protect the sanctity of the market-a purpose 
less conducive to norm development than a purpose framed in terms 
of the protection of personal property. Clearly, this barrier to norm 
development could be mitigated by developing the view that insider 
trading is very much like theft, a view gaining support in Great 
Britain.129 
There is little empirical proof that socio-pedagogical influences 
can be developed. However, it is theoretically possible to develop 
such influences, 130 and there is evidence that some influences presently 
exist for insider trading131-an activity that was perfectly l~gal 
forty-one years ago. In a survey conducted by The Annalist in 1915, 
all but a few of the corporate directors questioned felt that the use of 
inside information for personal profit was perfectly acceptable. One 
surveyed individual estimated that ninety per cent of all businessmen 
at that time perceived insider trading as ethically sound.132 It is not 
clear how drastically this view has changed. In 1961, only forty to 
sixty per cent of the business executives who were asked a series of 
questions concerning their ethical beliefs said that they were willing to 
trade on inside information.133 While it seems likely that this trend 
toward greater disapproval among businessmen has continued, 134 the 
over-all change is not tremendous. Yet the present weakness of 
socio-pedagogical norms and the lack of concrete evidence that they 
are easily developed does not necessarily counsel against the alloca-
tion of more resources to their development: Few resources have 
been invested to date to develop even the present weak norms, and 
changes may not require substantially greater resource outlays. Fur-
128. H. MANNE, supra note 45. 
129. Although insider trading is legal in Great Britain, it has been referred to 
as "legalized larceny." See Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (eastern ed.). 
130. See E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 34, at 59; Ball & Friedman, Tlze Use of 
Criminal Sanctions in t/ze Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological 
View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197,220 (1964). 
131. See Hetherington, Insider Trading and tlze Logic of tlze Law, 1967 WIS, L. 
REV. 720, 733. 
132. See THE ANNALIST, July 19, 1915, at 65. In his narrative of nineteenth-
century Wall Street, Henry Clews speaks in almost glowing terms of insiders who 
sold their companies' stock on the basis of nonpublic information and criticizes not 
the insiders, but the public who did not wait for further information. H. CLEWS, 
TwENIY-EIGHT YEARS IN WALL STREET 202-03 (1888), See also F. PECORA, WALL 
Snum:r UNDER OATII 152-61 (1939). 
133. Baumhart, supra note 70, at 16. 
134. See generally Hetherington, supra note 131, at 735-36. 
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therm.ore, norms developed in an effort to engender socio-pedagogical 
influences will indirectly yield substantial benefits in the form of 
secondary general deterrence.135 
Early regulation of insider trading under lOb-5 and 16(b) did 
not employ resources in a manner most conducive to the development 
of socio-pedagogical influences or the necessary underlying norms. 
The statutory prohibitions either covered only some instances of 
abuse of inside information or were characterized by uncertain di-
mensions. Consequently, the socio-pedagogical message, M, was 
incomplete, uncertain, and uninfluential, and the growth of the neces-
sary norms was stunted. 
A comprehensive definition of the prohibited activity was never 
clearly stated in the case of insider trading but was instead allowed to 
·develop haltingly over time. Until 1947, only those abusive uses of 
inside information within section 16 (b) even appeared to be prohib-
ited. In that year, rule l0b-5 was interpreted in Kardon v. National 
Gypsum Co.136 to apply to insider trading, but its reach was limited 
to a narrow range of insider transactions-those in which one party in 
a face-to-face transaction failed to disclose important information 
affecting the value of the stock.137 Because insider trading was 
never unequivocally branded as a prohibited activity during this early 
period, and because the extent of the prohibition was never clearly 
stated, the rankings Re and RP, which served as the content of the 
socio-pedagogical message, were very low. While vigorous enforce-
ment efforts and significant penalties were the order for the short-
swing type of insider trading, other abuses of inside information were 
left untouched. As a consequence, the average penalty and enforce-
ment levels for insider trading as a whole138 were low: The high 
levels under 16(b) were averaged with zero levels for other abuses of 
inside information. Thus, society actually conveyed the message 
during this earlier period that it did not view insider trading as 
particularly undesirable. 
Even the vigorous enforcement efforts and consistently designed 
and applied penalties under 16(b) were not as conducive to the 
development of norms during this period as they might have been. 
Section 16(b) was limited to sales and purchases within a six-month 
period, required both a purchase and a sale, and, thus, was based on 
an arbitrary rule that did not distinguish between wrongdoing and 
totally innocent exchanges. Such a detailed statutory structure failed 
to convey any strong feelings of "wrongness" since the activities it 
prohibited were little different from some of the activities it did not 
135. See text at notes 123-54 infra. 
136. 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa.). 
137. 83 F. Supp. at 614. 
138. See note 35 supra & accompanying text. 
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prohibit. Clearly, a much stronger message would have been gener-
ated had the 16(b) scheme separated the wrongdoing from the 
innocent activities.139 
In the last decade, much has been done to strengthen the socio-
pedagogical message. The reach of rule 1 0b-5 has been extended so 
that virtually all wrongful insider trading is prohibited. Dramatic 
and highly publicized enforcements, such as Texas Gulf Sulphur140 
and Merrill Lynch,141 and an increase in the number of litigated cases 
of insider trading have presumably caused an increase in the Ro 
factor communicated to the public, while large judgments for plain-
tiffs have presumably increased Rp. If this message is maintained 
over a significant period of time, socio-pedagogical influences asso-
ciated with insider trading should gradually increase. Yet, one imped-
iment to the maximization of socio-pedagogical influences remains 
-the substantial uncertainty that still surrounds the reach of rule 
lOb-5.142 Judicial opinions that increase the clarity of rule lOb-5 
will doubtless contribute to the development of socio-pedagogical 
influences. A better means of reducing the uncertainty would be to 
codify the last forty years of legal developments into a new statutory 
scheme of regulation for insider trading.143 Such a scheme would 
probably not require the expenditure of additional enforcement_ re-
sources. 
Several lessons can be learned from this experience with the 
development of socio-pedagogical influences in the area of insider 
trading. One is the desirability of avoiding statutes like 16(b) that 
lump together innocent and wrongful activity and that prohibit some 
but not all wrongful activity of a particular type. A second lesson is 
139. This conclusion suggests that the general conceptual formulation for the so-
cio-pedagogical message, M = k(R. + R.), must be modified in specific models to 
take account of enforcement resource allocations or penalties that are not capable of 
conveying "wrongness." This alteration could be made by discounting or lowering 
the rankings. 
140. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 976 (1968). 
141. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 49S F.2d 228 (2d 
Cir. 1974). 
142. See W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 394-9S. 
143. The American Law Institute bas attempted such a codification. See FED• 
ERAL SECURmES CODE§§ 1303, 1402, 1413 (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973). One 
commentator has stated: 
The question is simple: Insider trading must be regulated. The only problem 
is how. It is now being done in polyglot fashion through disciplinary and, more 
recently, restitutional proceedings, accompanied by judicial development of an 
entire common law of Rule lOb-5 governing the nghts of private litigants. But 
we have reached a point where corporate officials, shareholders and potential in-
vestors, insiders and outsiders alike, are entitled to more explicit language in the 
statute, the only ultimate reflection of the democratic process of representative 
government. This does not rule out the possibility, even the desirability, of fur-
ther rule-making powers being given to the Commission to elaborate the statu-
tory intent. 
W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 394-9S (footnotes omitted). 
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that vague prohibitions like lOb-5 are less efficient generators of 
socio-pedagogical influences than more certain statutes of similar 
breadth. Socio-pedagogical influences are developed essentially by 
the resources expended on primary general deterrence. In allocating 
these resources, first priority should be given to maximizing primary 
general deterrence since that element of prevention is most influen-
tial.144 Agencies should, however, consider socio-pedagogical influ-
ences in making allocation decisions, and they should avoid devising 
statutory and enforcement schemes that frustrate the development of 
such influences. 
E. Secondary General Deterrence and Insider Trading 
Much of the above discussion concerning inadequate norm invest-
ment is applicable also to secondary general deterrence, for the norms 
that must be developed to trigger socio-pedagogical influences also 
serve as the basis for secondary general deterrence. The strength and 
consistency of norms . necessary to support socio-pedagogical influ-
ences, however, may be substantially greater than that required to 
induce individuals to impose secondary costs. 
Strong norms are required to prevent or help prevent an individual 
from engaging in some activity that he expects will benefit him 
personally. Weaker norms, however, may be adequate to induce the 
general public to shun an individual, to refuse to employ him, or to 
doubt his reputation for honesty and integrity. To induce these 
secondary costs, norms need not overcome strong motivations of self-
interest; indeed, compliance with the norms may be synonymous with 
self-interest. For example, a businessman who personally views an 
activity as only somewhat reprehensible may nevertheless dismiss 
individuals under investigation or involved in litigation over this 
prohibited activity in order to avoid any public appearance of impro-
priety among his employees.145 Moreover, the failure to invest in 
norms cannot diminish the effectiveness of those secondary costs that 
are not imposed directly by other individuals. Attorney fees146 and 
lost income while involved in litigation or investigations will be 
incurred by a violator even if other members of the community view 
his action as proper. 
Both substantial automatic secondary costs in the form of attorney 
fees147 and a low threshold of norm strength necessary to support the 
144. See text at note 71 supra. 
145. See generally Baumhart, supra note 70, at 10. 
146. The effectiveness of this secondary cost is impaired by any practice of allow-
ing potential offenders to take out insurance policies that indemnify for attorney fees. 
See note 106 supra and accompanying text. 
147. Expectation of substantial attorney fees are extremely disconcerting and can 
also induce settlements of SEC suits. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan 28. 1972, at 17, col. 
1 (eastern ed.). 
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creation of secondary counter-motivations have apparently made sec-
ondary general deterrence a viable and growing prevention force for 
insider trading. Yet, the continued development of this element of 
prevention will require effort and planning. Other than attorney fees 
and expenditures of time and effort, secondary costs seem to take the 
form of fears of job dismissals, 148 ruined careers, 149 and general harm 
to reputations.159 Potential offenders will expect these costs only if 
those in positions to impose them agree with the spirit of the law. In 
the general model, it was implicitly assumed that there existed individ-
uals with the desired norms standing ready to impose these secondary 
costs on violators or alleged violators-that is, that the imposition of 
secondary costs depended only upon Fod• This assumption-that 
simply detecting a violation will result in the imposition of secondary 
costs-must be altered in the context of insider trading. 
Presumably, the potential inside trader today expects to incur 
significant secondary costs only if his superiors and fellow executives 
agree with the spirit of the prohibition or if he is associated with a 
company or industry that is subject to public pressure and is con-
cerned about its business image.151 In applying the general model to 
insider trading, therefore, it is necessary to change the (Fod + Foe) • S 
formula for secondary counter-motivations to (Fod + Foe) (Ft) • S 
where Ft represents the probability that a potential violator asso-
ciates with individuals who will impose secondary costs. 
If an inside trader does associate with individuals who are pre-
pared to impose secondary costs, mere detection or investigation 
(Fod) of his violation is apt to trigger those costs.162 Thus, a 
148. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1972, at 43, col. 4 (late city ed.) (individual 
charged in suit for insider trading resigned); id., Dec. 14, 1972, at 73, col. 1 (late 
city ed.) (Oppenheimer analyst immediately discharged for selectively disseminating 
a report); id., April 23, 1965, at 1, col. 6 (late city ed.) (Commerce Department 
aide resigned after buying Texas Gulf Sulphur stock on -a tip); Wall St. J., April 20, 
1973, at 1, col. 6 (eastern ed.) (Equity Funding personnel forced to resign). 
149. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1972, at 49, col. 4 (late city ed.) (individual 
claimed his career was ruined as the first person convicted W1der a 30-year-old statute 
prohibiting insider dealing in mutual funds). 
150. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1972, at 47, col. 5 (late city ed.) (former 
financial vice-president of Penn Central feared his silence would be interpreted as 
guilt by friends and former associates); id., Jan. 5, 1972, at 50, col. 3 (late city ed.) 
(security analysts group was concerned that splinter groups would violate insider trad-
ing rules and that these violations would be attributed to their group); Wall St. J,, 
June 1, 1973, at 2, col. 4 (eastern ed.) (bank feared any settlement that would imply 
wrongdoing); ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 111, at 45. 
151. See Symposium, White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 817, 825 
(1973 ). 
152. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1974, at 1, 28, col. 3 (eastern ed.): 
Even though such activities haven't been alleged on Mr. Langfields' part and 
charges haven't been brought, the SEC investigation already has cost Mr. Lang-
field dearly. He had earned a $25,000-a-year salary at IDS; now he is collect-
ing unemployment compensation and worrying about supporting his wife and 
five children while paying mounting legal fees. His cabin cruiser, a relic of 
flusher times, has been sold. "I'm really nervous about the future," he says, "be-
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potential inside trader cannot reasonably expect to avoid secondary 
costs by conducting a good court battle or negotiating a consent 
decree. Since secondary costs are influential for the typical potential 
inside trader, 153 the fact that they are so easily triggered further 
enhances their prevention efficacy. 
Positive levels of secondary general deterrence, then, depend most 
heavily both upon past norm development and upon the level of 
resources devoted to the communication of violations. As discussed 
above, the communication system in the area of insider trading does 
not lack development, but only careful use.154 The need for further 
investment in norm development is identical to the need set forth in . 
the discussion of socio-pedagogical influences except that a lesser 
degree of development may suffice to support secondary general 
deterrence alone. 
F. Conclusion 
This Note has suggested several changes in the allocation of 
resources to the prevention of insider trading, each of which would 
affect one or more of the basic elements of prevention. First, re-
sources should be expended to increase the probability of detection. 
This change would most directly affect primary general deterrence 
but is also an important triggering mechanism for secondary general 
deterrence and a part of the message necessary to develop the norms 
basic to secondary general deterrence and socio-pedagogical influ-
ences. Second, penalties should be redesigned so that they more 
accurately offset the offender's benefits. This change would improve 
primary general deterrence. Third, communication should be used 
more carefully to increase the prevention efficacy of all three ele-
ments. Finally, a statutory scheme should be designed that would 
use already committed resources more efficiently in communicating 
messages for norm development and would thus influence both socio-
pedagogical influences and secondary general deterrence. 
These reallocations should not be made, of course, unless the net 
marginal benefit of a change is greater than or equal to zero, and they 
certainly should not be made if the cost of prevention would then 
exceed K*, the social harm associated with no prevention. Such 
determinations require the exercise of judgment since exact measure-
cause trading is the only thing I know how to do, and these days I'm a leper 
to the securities industry." 
Mr. Langfield spends his time job hunting and writing poetry. He talks 
about possibly starting a fast-food franchise or an ice-cream store. Last month, 
to pick up some spare quarters, he bought five electronic game machines and 
installed them in Minneapolis-area restaurants. 
See sources cited in notes 148, 150 supra; ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 111, 
at 18. 
153. See text at note 73 supra. 
154. See text at notes 121-25 supra. 
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ments are impossible. But it would seem that these changes should 
be made. Only the recommended increase in the probability of 
detection requires substantial new resource expenditure; the other 
changes are essentially qualitative improvements in the use of cur-
rently committed resources. Because each change is likely to have 
multiple points of benefit, and because the bottleneck in detection is 
presently decreasing the return on resources already committed to 
other steps in the enforcement process, the benefits from the changes 
are very likely to outweigh the costs. 
